Criminal Responsibility and Psychiatric Disorders: Reflections on Judgment No. 22659 of 2023

Judgment No. 22659 of 2023 represents an important reference point in the field of criminal law, particularly concerning criminal responsibility in relation to psychiatric disorders. The Court of Cassation clarifies that the absence of the capacity to will can have a significant impact on an individual's criminal liability, even when the capacity to understand is present. This distinction is fundamental to understanding the dynamics of criminal responsibility.

The Distinction Between Capacity to Understand and Capacity to Will

According to the judgment, an individual's criminal responsibility can be influenced by the presence of a psychiatric disorder that exclusively affects their capacity to will. In this specific case, the Court establishes two necessary conditions for the absence of the capacity to will to be considered relevant:

• 1. The impulses to act must be so intense as to nullify the subject's ability to assess the consequences of their actions.
• 2. There must be an etiological link between the mental disorder and the criminal conduct.

This position aligns with the provisions of Articles 85 and 88 of the Italian Penal Code, which govern the issue of criminal responsibility and the subject's capacities at the time of committing an offense. Therefore, the Court does not merely consider the absence of the capacity to understand but places strong emphasis on the will as a crucial element in assessing criminal responsibility.

The suitability of a psychiatric disorder to affect only the capacity to will, and not the capacity to understand, which remains intact - Consequences regarding criminal responsibility. In terms of criminal responsibility, the absence of the capacity to will can assume autonomous and decisive relevance, valuable for the purposes of the judgment pursuant to Articles 85 and 88 of the Penal Code, even in the presence of an ascertained capacity to understand (and to comprehend the social wrongfulness of the criminal act), provided that two essential and concurrent conditions are met: a) the impulses to act that the agent perceives and recognizes as reprehensible (being endowed with the capacity to understand) are of such breadth and consistency as to nullify the capacity to appreciate their consequences; b) there is an etiological link with the specific criminal conduct, by virtue of which the criminal act is considered causally determined by that specific mental disorder, which must indeed be deemed capable of altering not the understanding, but only the will of the perpetrator of the illicit conduct. It follows that the existence of an impulse, or a stimulus to illicit action, cannot in itself be considered a cause sufficient on its own to determine an action inconsistent with the value system of the person performing it; instead, it is incumbent upon the interested party to demonstrate the compelling nature of the impulse in the specific case.

Practical Implications of the Judgment

This judgment offers important insights not only for legal professionals but also for professionals in the psychiatric field. Indeed, the assessment of the capacity to will in a criminal context requires interdisciplinary collaboration between lawyers and mental health experts. It is essential that the psychiatric disorder be thoroughly analyzed to establish whether it effectively influenced the defendant's capacity to will.

Furthermore, the judgment underscores the need for rigorous proof by the defense to demonstrate the compelling influence of impulses. This presents a significant challenge, as it is not enough to assert that a psychiatric disorder exists; it is necessary to demonstrate the direct link between the disorder and the criminal act.

Conclusions

In conclusion, Judgment No. 22659 of 2023 by the Court of Cassation significantly clarifies the relationship between psychiatric disorders and criminal responsibility. It establishes that the capacity to will and the capacity to understand are two distinct dimensions, each with its own weight in determining criminal responsibility. This distinction is crucial for the correct application of criminal law and for ensuring that justice is administered equitably. The judgment calls for a more nuanced and scientific approach to issues of criminal responsibility, emphasizing the importance of psychiatric evaluation in criminal proceedings.