The Supreme Court on Doubly "De Relato" Testimony: Evidentiary Value and Need for Corroboration (Judgment no. 25349 of 2025)

The Italian judicial system, and particularly the criminal justice system, is founded on the pursuit of procedural truth through the accurate evaluation of evidence. Among these, testimony plays a central role, often representing the "voice" of the facts. However, its nature can vary considerably, distinguishing between direct testimony – that given by someone who personally perceived the facts – and indirect testimony, or "de relato," meaning that of someone reporting facts learned from others. But what happens when this chain of information extends further, transforming into "doubly de relato" testimony? The Court of Cassation, with its recent judgment no. 25349 of 2025, has provided important clarifications on this delicate aspect, reaffirming a fundamental principle for the protection of procedural guarantees.

The Chain of Testimony: From "De Relato" to "Doubly De Relato"

The Italian Code of Criminal Procedure dedicates ample space to the regulation of testimony, with particular attention to Article 195 of the c.p.p., which governs indirect testimony. This rule establishes that, if a witness reports facts learned from other persons, the judge may order that these latter individuals be called to testify. The objective is clear: to privilege the direct source, the one closest to the fact, to ensure the greatest possible reliability of the evidence. The problem becomes more complicated, however, when the witness's source, in turn, learned the facts from yet another person. It is in this scenario that "doubly de relato" statements come into play, meaning testimonies that report not only what was told by others, but what was told by others who, in turn, reported facts learned from third parties. A sort of multi-level "hearsay," whose evidentiary reliability is, understandably, severely tested.

The Supreme Court's Ruling: A Limit to Direct Evidence

Judgment no. 25349 of 2025 by the Second Criminal Section of the Court of Cassation, presided over by G. V. and with G. A. as Rapporteur, intervenes precisely on this issue, partially annulling with referral a previous decision by the Court of Appeal of Catania. The ruling is of particular significance because it sets precise boundaries on the evaluation of such statements. The ruling states:

In matters of indirect testimony, doubly "de relato" statements, which report circumstances whose declarative source, in turn, learned them "de relato," do not constitute direct evidence but mere indications, capable of forming the basis of a conviction only if accompanied by other suitable elements pursuant to Article 192, paragraph 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

This statement is of paramount importance. The Supreme Court clarifies that doubly "de relato" statements cannot be considered equivalent to direct evidence; rather, they assume the nature of simple indications. This means that, by themselves, they are not sufficient to form the basis of a conviction. Their value is subordinate to the presence of further elements of proof that corroborate them. This principle translates into some fundamental implications:

• **Indicative Nature:** Doubly "de relato" statements do not have the value of full proof, but only of indication.
• **Need for Corroboration:** To be used for evidentiary purposes, they must be supported by other suitable elements.
• **Evidentiary Standard:** Such corroboration must meet the requirements of Article 192, paragraph 2, of the c.p.p., meaning they must be serious, precise, and consistent.
• **Guarantee for the Defendant:** It prevents a conviction from being based solely on "third-hand" information, which may be distorted or inaccurate.

The Role of Art. 192 c.p.p. and the Need for Corroboration

The reference to Article 192, paragraph 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure is crucial. This rule establishes that "the existence of a fact cannot be inferred from indications unless they are serious, precise, and consistent." In the context of doubly "de relato" statements, this means that indications derived from such testimonies must be verified and confirmed by other evidentiary elements that attest to their reliability and consistency with the overall picture. Without such corroboration, the doubly "de relato" statement remains a weak element, insufficient to support a charge. The Court's caution is motivated by the awareness that each step in the chain of information transmission increases the risk of alterations, misunderstandings, or even deliberate manipulation. Ensuring that procedural truth is based on solid and verifiable elements is a cornerstone of the rule of law and the principle of a fair trial, as also enshrined in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

Conclusions: A Beacon for Criminal Justice

Judgment no. 25349 of 2025 by the Court of Cassation represents an important orientation for legal professionals. It strengthens the guarantees for the defendant G. G. and for all individuals involved in criminal proceedings, emphasizing the need for a rigorous and critical approach in evaluating evidence. The distinction between direct evidence and indication, and the consequent requirement for qualified corroboration for the latter, is a cornerstone of our evidentiary system. Lawyers, Public Prosecutors, and judges must continue to pay the utmost attention to the origin and solidity of testimonial sources, especially when they present themselves in the complex and potentially fragile form of doubly "de relato" statements. Only in this way will it be possible to ensure that every judicial decision is based on a robust and unequivocal evidentiary framework, while simultaneously protecting the pursuit of truth and the fundamental rights of the individual.