The Court of Cassation, with Ruling No. 22663 of May 29, 2025 (filed June 17, 2025), has provided fundamental clarification on the revocation of driving licenses and preventive measures. The decision addresses the criminal consequences of driving without a license when the revocation is based on a norm subsequently declared unconstitutional. A crucial pronouncement for the protection of individual rights and the coherence of the legal system.
At the heart of the issue is Article 120, paragraph 2, of the Highway Code (Legislative Decree No. 285/1992). In its original wording, it imposed the automatic revocation of the driving license for individuals subjected to preventive measures. This automaticity was modified by the Constitutional Court Ruling No. 99 of 2020, which declared the norm illegitimate, transforming "shall provide" into "may provide." A change that re-established the principles of proportionality and the need for case-by-case evaluation.
The Cassation Court Ruling No. 22663 of 2025 examines the case of G. D. G., accused of driving without a license following an automatic revocation (under former Article 120 of the Highway Code) that occurred before Constitutional Court Ruling No. 99/2020. The Supreme Court, presided over by D. M. G. and with L. A. V. as rapporteur, quashed the conviction without referral, affirming an essential principle:
The offense referred to in Article 73 of Legislative Decree No. 159 of September 6, 2011, is not applicable in cases where the recipient of a preventive measure has driven a vehicle despite the automatic revocation of their driving license, which was imposed before the Constitutional Court Ruling No. 99 of 2020. This ruling declared Article 120, paragraph 2, of Legislative Decree No. 285 of April 30, 1992, unconstitutional, specifically the part stating that the Prefect "shall provide" – instead of "may provide" – for the revocation of driving licenses for individuals who are or have been subjected to preventive measures. (This case concerns a driving license revocation decree that was subsequently annulled by the prefecture on its own initiative after the offense was ascertained. In this context, the Court specified that the judge, irrespective of any consideration regarding the retroactive effect of the measure adopted on its own initiative, is obliged to disregard the license revocation decree, as it suffers from a genetic defect stemming from the declaration of unconstitutionality of the norm that mandated its compulsory issuance).
The Cassation Court clarifies that the offense of driving without a license (Article 73 of Legislative Decree No. 159/2011) does not exist if the revocation was based on a norm declared unconstitutional, for facts preceding such declaration. The revocation decree is affected by a "genetic defect," illegitimate from its inception. The criminal judge has a duty to "disapply" such a measure, recognizing its constitutional flaw, even if it has not been formally annulled by the administration.
This ruling emphasizes:
Ruling No. 22663 of 2025 serves as an important reminder of the importance of constitutional compliance in legislation. It ensures that citizens are not held criminally liable for conduct prohibited by administrative acts that are flawed from their origin, promoting substantive justice and coherence within our legal system.