Imputability and Psychiatric Disorders: Reflections on Ruling No. 22659 of 2023

Ruling No. 22659 of 2023 represents an important benchmark in the field of criminal law, particularly concerning imputability in relation to psychiatric disorders. The Court of Cassation clarifies that the absence of the capacity to will can have a significant impact on an individual's criminal responsibility, even when the capacity to understand is present. This distinction is fundamental to understanding the dynamics of responsibility in the criminal sphere.

The Distinction Between Capacity to Understand and Capacity to Will

According to the ruling, a subject's imputability can be influenced by the presence of a psychiatric disorder that exclusively affects their capacity to will. In this specific case, the Court establishes two necessary conditions for the absence of the capacity to will to be considered relevant:

• 1. The impulses to act must be so intense as to nullify the subject's capacity to evaluate the consequences of their actions.
• 2. There must be an etiological link between the mental disorder and the criminal conduct.

This position is in line with what is provided for by Articles 85 and 88 of the penal code, which govern the issue of imputability and the subject's capacities at the time of committing a crime. The Court, therefore, does not limit itself to considering the absence of the capacity to understand but places strong emphasis on the will as a crucial element in the assessment of imputability.

The suitability of a psychiatric disorder to affect only the capacity to will and not that to understand, which remains intact - Consequences regarding imputability. In terms of imputability, the absence of the capacity to will can assume autonomous and decisive relevance, valuable for the purposes of the judgment pursuant to Articles 85 and 88 of the penal code, even in the presence of an ascertained capacity to understand (and to comprehend the social disvalue of the criminal act), provided that two essential and concurrent conditions exist: a) the impulses to act that the agent perceives and recognizes as reprehensible (being endowed with the capacity to understand) are of such breadth and consistency as to nullify the capacity to appreciate their consequences; b) there is an etiological link with the specific criminal conduct, by virtue of which the criminal act is considered causally determined by that specific mental disorder, which must indeed be considered capable of altering not the understanding, but only the will of the perpetrator of the illicit conduct. It follows that the existence of an impulse, or a stimulus to illicit action, cannot in itself be considered a cause sufficient on its own to determine an action inconsistent with the value system of the person performing it, but it is incumbent upon the interested party to demonstrate the compelling nature of the impulse itself in the individual case.

Practical Implications of the Ruling

This ruling offers important reflections not only for legal professionals but also for professionals in the psychiatric field. Indeed, the assessment of the capacity to will in a criminal context requires interdisciplinary collaboration between lawyers and mental health experts. It is essential that the psychiatric disorder be analyzed in depth to establish whether it has indeed influenced the defendant's capacity to will.

Furthermore, the ruling emphasizes the need for rigorous proof by the defense to demonstrate the compelling influence of impulses. This poses a significant challenge, as it is not enough to state that a psychiatric disorder exists; it is necessary to demonstrate the direct link between the disorder and the criminal action.

Conclusions

In conclusion, Ruling No. 22659 of 2023 by the Court of Cassation significantly clarifies the relationship between psychiatric disorders and criminal responsibility. It establishes that the capacity to will and the capacity to understand are two distinct dimensions, each with its own weight in determining imputability. This distinction is crucial for the correct application of criminal law and to ensure that justice is administered equitably. The ruling calls for a more nuanced and scientific approach to issues of imputability, emphasizing the importance of psychiatric evaluation in criminal proceedings.