The judicial system, by its nature, is complex and not immune to errors, and it is within this context that the fundamental principle of compensation for unjust detention is situated. This is a right recognized for those who have unjustly suffered a deprivation of personal liberty, irrespective of a final conviction. But what happens when the suspect dies before the conclusion of the proceedings? And what are the rights of their heirs? The Supreme Court of Cassation, with its recent ruling No. 17494 of 06/05/2025 (filed on 08/05/2025), has provided crucial clarification on these questions, outlining the boundaries within which such compensation can be granted.
The right to compensation for unjust detention finds its basis in Article 24 of the Italian Constitution, which protects the right to defense, and in Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which guarantees the right to liberty and security. At the domestic level, the regulation is specifically contained in Article 314 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CPP), which establishes the conditions for obtaining compensation. This provision aims to compensate for the prejudice, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary, suffered by those who have been unjustly deprived of personal liberty.
Case law has long recognized the compensatory nature of this indemnity, albeit with peculiarities that distinguish it from common damages. The Constitutional Court, on several occasions, has emphasized the importance of this institution as a safeguard of legal civilization, aimed at mitigating the consequences of a judicial error or a precautionary measure not supported by a subsequent finding of guilt.
In matters of compensation for unjust detention, the right to indemnity in favor of the heirs of a suspect whose case was dismissed due to their death is only applicable if an acquittal judgment for the non-existence of the fact is pronounced against co-defendants.
This is the summary extracted from ruling No. 17494/2025, presided over by A. M. and with G. C. as rapporteur. The principle enunciated by the Supreme Court is of fundamental importance and introduces a very strict limit for the heirs of a deceased suspect. In practice, if criminal proceedings against a person are dismissed due to their death, their heirs can only obtain compensation for the unjust detention suffered by their relative if, in the same procedural context, an acquittal judgment has been pronounced for any co-defendants, and this acquittal must be specifically motivated by the "non-existence of the fact."
The ruling in question rejected the appeal filed by the defense of the defendant F. C. (whose case had been dismissed due to death), confirming the decision of the Court of Appeal of Catanzaro of 22/04/2024. In that case, compensation had been denied despite the co-defendants being acquitted for "not having committed the act." This distinction is crucial and deserves further examination.
The case law of the Supreme Court, and in particular ruling No. 17494/2025, highlights a subtle but decisive distinction between two different acquittal formulas provided for by our legal system:
The Supreme Court, in the case of F. C., reiterated that for the heirs of the deceased, the acquittal of co-defendants for "not having committed the fact" is not sufficient to establish the right to compensation. Proof that the fact itself never existed ("non-existence of the fact") is required. This strict interpretation aims to ensure that compensation is granted only in the presence of a clear and definitive absence of criminal responsibility, even at an objective level, which can extend by implication to the position of the deceased. In the absence of a definitive judicial finding on the non-existence of the fact, the death of the suspect, even if leading to dismissal, cannot automatically be equated to a full acquittal that justifies compensation.
Ruling No. 17494/2025 of the Supreme Court of Cassation represents an important reference point for case law on compensation for unjust detention, particularly concerning the rights of heirs. It highlights the need for careful and rigorous interpretation of procedural rules, balancing the protection of victims of judicial errors with the requirement of legal certainty.
For legal professionals and citizens alike, this decision reiterates that obtaining compensation for unjust detention by the heirs of a deceased suspect is not automatic, but is subject to precise and non-negotiable conditions, which require careful assessment of the procedural outcome for co-defendants and, above all, of the specific acquittal formula adopted. Only an acquittal for "non-existence of the fact" against co-defendants can pave the way for the recognition of this delicate right.