Driving Under the Influence and Community Service: The Burden of Initiation According to the Supreme Court (Judgment 17884/2025)

The question of who should bear the burden of initiating the procedure for carrying out community service, an increasingly common substitute penalty for offenses such as driving under the influence, has often generated uncertainty. A recent and significant ruling by the Court of Cassation, Judgment no. 17884 of 07/02/2025 (filed on 13/05/2025), intervenes to clarify this matter, precisely outlining responsibilities and dispelling divergent interpretations.

Regulatory Context and Substitute Penalty

Driving under the influence, governed by Article 186 of the Highway Code, is an offense that can lead, among other penalties, to the application of community service (LPU) as a substitute penalty. This option, introduced to promote the rehabilitation and social reintegration of the convicted person, allows for the conversion of custodial or pecuniary sentences into unpaid work for the benefit of the community. Legislative Decree no. 274/2000, in Article 43, generally governs the execution of substitute penalties. However, the critical point concerned the identification of the party responsible for actually initiating the performance of such work once ordered by the judge.

Traditionally, one might have thought that the convicted person should be the first to act, seeking a partner organization or submitting requests. This interpretation, however, risked creating disparities and complications, especially for less informed individuals or those with fewer resources. It is in this scenario that the Court of Cassation has intervened, providing a fundamental interpretation for the correct management of these penalties.

Judgment 17884/2025: A Crucial Clarification

Judgment no. 17884/2025, issued by the Fifth Criminal Section of the Court of Cassation (President L. V., Rapporteur D. C.), addressed the case of D. S., annulling the order of the Court of Crotone without referral. The core of the decision revolves around a cardinal principle that the Court wished to strongly reaffirm:

In matters of driving under the influence, it is the duty of the public prosecutor, as the body responsible for the execution of the sentence, to initiate the procedure for carrying out the work activity designated as a substitute penalty for the imposed sentence, and this duty does not fall upon the convicted person.

This maxim is of extraordinary importance. The Court of Cassation unequivocally establishes that the initiative to commence community service rests with the Public Prosecutor. It is not the convicted person who must "find" work or urge the UEPE (Office for the Execution of External Penal Sentences) for assignment. On the contrary, it is the Public Prosecutor, as the body responsible for the execution of the sentence, who must activate all necessary procedures to ensure that the convicted person can effectively perform the substitute work activity. The Court applied this principle by annulling an order that had rejected a convicted person's request for a time extension, precisely due to the inaction of the competent UEPE and the expiry of the deadline set in the sentence for commencing the activity.

This ruling aligns with previous consistent judgments (e.g., Section 4, no. 7172 of 2016, Rv. 266618-01 and Section 4, no. 53684 of 2016, Rv. 268551-01), reinforcing a jurisprudential trend aimed at protecting the position of the convicted person and ensuring the correct execution of criminal penalties.

Practical Implications for Convicted Persons and Execution Bodies

The consequences of this judgment are significant for both convicted persons and the bodies responsible for the execution of sentences:

• For the Convicted Person: They will no longer have to worry about "finding" an activity or independently initiating the procedure. The responsibility lies with the Public Prosecutor's office. This does not exempt the convicted person from cooperation once contacted, but it relieves them of the initial burden of initiation. In case of inaction, as in the case of D. S., they can invoke Article 175 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (time extension) to avoid forfeiture.
• For the Public Prosecutor and the UEPE: They must take proactive and timely steps to initiate the procedure for assigning and carrying out community service. This is an official duty that ensures the effectiveness of the penalty and the protection of the convicted person's rights. Inaction by these offices can lead to the annulment of decisions detrimental to the convicted person.
• Principle of Legality and Due Process: The judgment reaffirms a fundamental principle of our legal system: the execution of sentences is a state responsibility, which must act proactively to ensure the application of the law and respect for the rights of the convicted person, preventing undue burdens from falling upon the latter.

Conclusions

Judgment no. 17884 of 2025 by the Court of Cassation represents a firm point in the complex matter of the execution of substitute penalties. It clarifies that the burden of initiating the procedure for carrying out community service in cases of driving under the influence rests solely with the Public Prosecutor. This decision not only offers greater legal certainty but also strengthens the protection of the convicted person, ensuring that the execution of the sentence occurs according to principles of efficiency and justice. For those in this situation, or for legal professionals, knowledge of this ruling is essential for acting correctly and asserting one's rights.