House Arrest and Electronic Tagging: Analysis of Judgment No. 15939 of 2024

The recent judgment No. 15939 of March 14, 2024, issued by the Court of Liberty of Turin, offers significant insights into the interpretation of electronic tagging within the scope of personal precautionary measures. In particular, the judge emphasized that the use of such a device does not represent a new form of coercive measure, but rather constitutes an ordinary method of executing house arrest.

The Legal Context of the Judgment

The case addressed by the judgment concerns the request to substitute pre-trial detention with house arrest, enhanced by the use of an electronic tag. However, the Court deemed that, given the specific nature of the alleged offense and the dangerousness of the suspect, detention within prison walls was the only appropriate measure. This decision is based on a strict interpretation of the law, particularly Articles 274 and 275 of the New Code of Criminal Procedure, which govern precautionary measures.

Electronic Tagging: An Ordinary Execution Measure

The core of the decision lies in the following maxim:

Prescription of the so-called "electronic tag" - Mere ordinary execution method of domiciliary custody - Request for substitution of pre-trial detention - Rejection due to the suspect's dangerousness and the specific nature of the offense - Justification regarding the inadequacy of self-custody even if reinforced by the application of the electronic tag - Necessity - Exclusion - Reasons. In the context of house arrest, the prescription of the so-called "electronic tag" does not constitute a new type of coercive measure, but a mere ordinary execution method of domiciliary custody. Therefore, if the judge considers only detention within prison walls to be adequate due to the suspect's dangerousness and the specific nature of the alleged offense, they are not required to provide specific justification regarding the inadequacy of house arrest, even if it is accompanied by the use of an electronic tag.

This jurisprudential position clarifies that, although electronic tagging may appear to be a technological advancement in precautionary measures, it does not alter the assessment of the suspect's dangerousness. Consequently, the judge may decide not to provide further justification for the inadequacy of house arrest if it is deemed insufficient to protect public safety.

Conclusions

In conclusion, judgment No. 15939 of 2024 marks an important step in the understanding of precautionary measures, highlighting that the implementation of electronic tagging does not introduce a new form of custody but merely modifies the execution methods of house arrest. This implies that the judge must always prioritize the consideration of the subject's dangerousness and the specific details of the alleged crime, thereby ensuring a balance between individual rights and collective security.