The Supreme Court on Hearsay Testimony: The Rigorous Assessment of Reliability in Ruling No. 31241 of 2025
In the landscape of criminal law, "de relato" testimony – meaning the declaration of facts learned from others – requires particularly careful evaluation. The Supreme Court, in Ruling No. 31241 of 2025, presided over by G. V. and authored by A. S., has provided crucial clarification on the judgment criteria for this type of evidence. The ruling, which involved the defendant S. D. G. and an inadmissibility decision by the Rome Liberty Tribunal, reinforces the need for a rigorous approach to protect rights and ensure the fairness of the proceedings.
The Circumstantial Nature of "De Relato" Testimony
"De relato" testimony occurs when a witness reports in court what they were told by a third party, not what they perceived directly. This form of evidence is inherently delicate, introducing a "filter" between the fact and the judge and increasing the risk of distortion. The Code of Criminal Procedure, particularly Articles 192 and 195, cautiously regulates indirect testimony, recognizing its peculiar nature. The ruling in question falls within this context, outlining clear principles for its evaluation.
In matters of indirect testimony, the declarations of a "de relato" witness must be considered as circumstantial or "indirect" evidence of the fact and, for the purpose of a guilty verdict, must be subjected to an in-depth evaluative assessment, including a rigorous examination of the reliability not only of the declarant but also of the referenced individual, whether they confirm or, even more so, deny the statements attributed to them.
This maxim from the Supreme Court is the core of the ruling. It establishes that "de relato" declarations are not direct evidence but "circumstantial or indirect evidence." This implies that they cannot solely form the basis of a guilty verdict and require corroboration. The judge must conduct an "in-depth evaluative assessment," extending the "rigorous examination of reliability" not only to the person reporting (the "de relato" witness) but also to the "referenced individual" (the original source). It is essential to assess their credibility, motives, and consistency. The ruling clarifies that this dual examination is indispensable both when the source confirms and, "even more so," when they deny the attributed statements, preventing superficiality in the evaluation.
The Double Check: Guarantee of Robust Fact-Finding
The principle of the "double reliability check" established by Ruling No. 31241/2025 is a fundamental guarantee. The credibility of the "de relato" witness is not sufficient; it is indispensable to extend the investigation to the credibility of the primary source. This multidimensional approach aims to reduce the risk of judicial errors, in line with the principle of a fair trial and European standards. For an effective evaluation, the judge must consider:
- The internal consistency of the "de relato" witness's account.
- The intrinsic reliability of the original source.
- The existence of motives of interest or resentment in the source.
- The presence of external corroboration or refutation.
The circumstantial nature of indirect testimony requires that, without significant corroboration and a positive double check, it cannot constitute full proof of guilt.
Conclusions: Protection and Clarity in Criminal Law
Ruling No. 31241 of 2025 by the Supreme Court, by clarifying the evaluation criteria for "de relato" testimony, significantly strengthens procedural guarantees. By reiterating the circumstantial nature of this evidence and the non-negotiable necessity of a double reliability check – for both the witness and the source – the Supreme Court establishes a bulwark against uncertainty and potential distortions. This ruling not only protects the rights of the defendant but also elevates the quality of fact-finding in criminal proceedings, ensuring that every conviction is based on solid and rigorously verified evidence, in full adherence to the principles of justice and legality.
