In the complex landscape of civil proceedings, the Court-Appointed Expert Opinion (CTU) plays a crucial role, providing the judge with indispensable tools for resolving issues requiring specific technical expertise. However, it is not uncommon for differing expert opinions to emerge during a trial, sometimes resulting from multiple consultations over time. How should a judge proceed when faced with such discrepancies? The Ordinance of the Court of Cassation no. 15596 of June 11, 2025, provides essential clarification, outlining the boundaries and methods of judicial reasoning in these delicate circumstances.
The issue arose in the proceedings between parties P. and S., which had its first instance judgment at the Court of Appeal of Catania, which had rejected the claims. The core of the dispute, which then reached the Court of Cassation under the presidency of Dr. S. A. and with Dr. I. E. as rapporteur, concerned precisely the evaluation of multiple court-appointed expert opinions with conflicting results. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine if and how the judge could adhere to one of the opinions, particularly the latest one, without incurring a flaw in reasoning.
The Court of Cassation, with Ordinance no. 15596/2025, has offered a principle of law of great practical relevance for the legal community and citizens. The ruling, which deserves to be read in full, states:
In the presence of two successive conflicting court-appointed expert opinions, if the judge adheres (even without specific justification) to the opinion of the expert who completed their work last, the flaw in reasoning is excluded if the second expert opinion provides the elements that allow, on a positive level, to outline the logical path followed and, on a negative level, to exclude the relevance of contrary elements, whether they are stated in the first report or deducible elsewhere.
This means that the judge can legitimately choose to adopt the opinion of the expert who worked last, even without having to specify in detail why this latest consultation is to be preferred over previous ones. The key lies, rather, in the intrinsic soundness of the second opinion: it must be so complete and well-argued as to independently justify the decision, both by illustrating its logical path and by refuting, implicitly or explicitly, the divergent conclusions or contrary elements present in the first report or emerging from other sources.
The ruling aligns with established principles regarding the evaluation of evidence and the powers of the judge, indirectly referencing Article 191 and Article 195 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which govern the institution of expert opinions, and Article 360, paragraph 1, no. 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, concerning flaws in reasoning.
The Ordinance clarifies that the judge's adherence to the latest opinion is not a passive acceptance but requires the consultation itself to be intrinsically robust. To exclude a flaw in reasoning, the second expert opinion must therefore meet two fundamental requirements:
The judge, although being the peritus peritorum, meaning the expert of experts, cannot substitute the technician in specific competencies but must carefully assess the logic and completeness of the arguments provided, especially when faced with divergent positions.
This ruling has significant implications for procedural strategy. For lawyers, it underscores the importance of carefully examining expert opinions, especially when multiple CTUs are involved. It is crucial that objections to the first consultation are well-documented and that the second consultation, if requested or produced, is meticulously argued, anticipating and refuting possible criticisms or conflicting elements in advance. For the parties, it means that the validity of technical evidence depends not only on its intrinsic correctness but also on its ability to withstand challenges and provide complete and self-sufficient reasoning.
Ordinance no. 15596/2025 of the Court of Cassation brings clarity to a crucial aspect of civil evidence, reiterating the centrality of sound judicial reasoning, even when choosing between conflicting expert opinions. The decision reinforces the idea that the judge, while able to adhere to the latest expert report, must always base their choice on a critical analysis that attests to its logical foundation and its ability to overcome objections. This principle protects the fairness of the process and the certainty of the law, ensuring that decisions are always supported by transparent and verifiable reasoning.