The Italian legal landscape, particularly concerning road traffic and penalties, is constantly evolving. Decisions by Superior Courts, such as the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court, play a fundamental role in defining the boundaries and application of norms. Ordinance No. 16353 of June 17, 2025, issued by the Second Section of the Court of Cassation, fits precisely into this context, providing crucial clarification regarding the scope of the declaration of constitutional illegitimacy concerning vehicle confiscation for the offense of drunk driving.
To fully understand the scope of the Ordinance in question, it is essential to recall the relevant regulatory framework. The Highway Code (Legislative Decree 285/1992) provides for severe penalties for drunk driving, including license revocation and vehicle confiscation. In particular, Article 186 of the Highway Code governs the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol, with varying degrees of penalties depending on the blood alcohol level detected. Paragraph 2-bis of this article, for example, deals with the more serious cases, i.e., those where the driver, with a blood alcohol level exceeding 1.5 g/l, causes a road accident.
The Constitutional Court, with judgment No. 75 of 2020, had declared the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 224-ter, paragraph 6, of the Highway Code. This ruling specifically concerned the accessory penalty of vehicle confiscation. The Court had noted an unreasonable disparity in treatment between those who, having committed the offense of drunk driving, had their penalty substituted with "probation" and those who, instead, obtained the substitution of the penalty with "community service" pursuant to Article 186, paragraph 9-bis, of the Highway Code. For the latter category, in fact, confiscation was excluded, unlike the former.
Ordinance No. 16353/2025, reported by Dr. R. Guida, addresses the question of whether the declaration of constitutional illegitimacy under judgment No. 75/2020 can also be extended to the accessory penalty of driver's license revocation, specifically provided for by Article 186, paragraph 2-bis, of the Highway Code. The Supreme Court, rejecting the appeal filed by L. against P. (State Advocate General's Office), answered this question negatively, reiterating its non-extendibility.
The core of the decision lies in the clear distinction between the cases considered. The Constitutional Court had focused on vehicle confiscation and its unjustified application to those who opt for probation compared to those who perform community service. However, as highlighted by Ordinance 16353/2025, "community service" is not applicable to the cases provided for in paragraph 2-bis of Article 186 of the Highway Code, i.e., when drunk driving (with a blood alcohol level exceeding 1.5 g/l) has caused a road accident. This is a fundamental distinction that justifies different penalty treatment.
The jurisprudential ruling contained in Ordinance 16353/2025 is clear and precise:
The declaration of constitutional illegitimacy of art. 224-ter, paragraph 6, of the Highway Code, as per judgment no. 75 of 2020, cannot be extended to the accessory penalty of driver's license revocation pursuant to art. 186, paragraph 2-bis, of the Highway Code, as the Constitutional Court ruled on the unreasonable disparity in treatment provided with regard to the accessory penalty of vehicle confiscation for the perpetrator of the drunk driving offense whose penalty has been substituted with probation, compared to the one whose penalty has been substituted with community service based on art. 186, paragraph 9-bis, of the Highway Code, since the latter is not applicable to the cases provided for in paragraph 2-bis of the aforementioned art. 186, i.e., to the case of the driver with a confirmed blood alcohol level exceeding 1.5 g/l, who has caused a road accident.
This ruling crystallizes the principle that the Constitutional Court's judgment No. 75/2020 has a well-defined scope of application and cannot be interpreted expansively. In other words, the Constitutional Court corrected an imbalance concerning vehicle confiscation, but this correction does not automatically extend to all other accessory penalties, particularly license revocation for the most serious cases of drunk driving with an accident. The reasons for this non-extension are well-founded:
This means that for drivers who, while severely intoxicated (over 1.5 g/l), cause an accident, license revocation remains an automatic and unavoidable consequence, not mitigable by the considerations made by the Constitutional Court regarding confiscation in different contexts.
Ordinance No. 16353/2025 of the Court of Cassation represents an important milestone in the jurisprudence concerning drunk driving. It clarifies that the protection offered by constitutional judgment No. 75/2020, while relevant for vehicle confiscation under certain conditions, cannot be invoked to evade the penalty of license revocation in the most serious cases of driving under the influence of alcohol that have caused an accident. The distinction made by the Supreme Court is crucial: it reaffirms the legislator's severity towards conduct that gravely endangers road safety, highlighting how license revocation is a measure proportionate to the dangerousness of those who drive while intoxicated and cause a crash. For legal professionals and citizens, it is essential to be aware of this interpretation to fully understand the legal consequences of violations of the Highway Code.