Eventual Intent and Moral Complicity in Attempted Crimes: A Crucial Clarification from the Court of Cassation (Judgment 22007/2025)

Criminal law, with its nuances and complexities, is a constantly evolving field, where every judicial pronouncement can mark a turning point. The recent Judgment no. 22007 of April 30, 2025, of the Criminal Court of Cassation, presided over by B. M. and with R. C. as the rapporteur, offers an important clarification on the delicate relationship between eventual intent and the liability of a moral accomplice in an attempted crime. This decision, which partially annulled with referral the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Naples of July 12, 2024, in the case of the defendant U. G., is destined to profoundly influence the application of Articles 110 and 56 of the Criminal Code.

Complicity in Crimes: What Does it Mean to be a "Moral Accomplice"?

Article 110 of the Criminal Code states that "When several persons participate in the same crime, each of them shall be subject to the penalty established for it." This provision extends criminal liability not only to those who materially commit the criminal act (the material perpetrator) but also to those who, without directly participating in its execution, contribute to its realization in other ways. We are referring to the "moral accomplice," i.e., someone whose conduct strengthens another's criminal intent, incites, advises, or provides decisive psychological support. The key issue is the degree of "intent" required of the moral accomplice for liability, especially when the crime does not come to completion, remaining in the attempt phase.

The Ruling of Judgment 22007/2025: Eventual Intent and Attempted Crime

The core of the Cassation's ruling is encapsulated in its headnote:

In matters of complicity in crimes, the moral accomplice, unlike the perpetrator of the typical conduct, is liable for the attempted crime even if the outcome was willed by him not with direct intent, but with eventual intent. (In its reasoning, the Court also clarified that the act cannot be attributed to the moral accomplice under the heading of anomalous complicity, as, having acted with intent, he has already considered the more serious crime as a possible further or different consequence of the agreed criminal conduct).

This statement is of significant scope. Traditionally, for the configuration of an attempted crime (Article 56 of the Criminal Code), "direct intent" was required, meaning the specific and immediate will to achieve the criminal outcome. Judgment 22007/2025, however, establishes that for the moral accomplice, "eventual intent" is sufficient. But what do these distinctions mean?

• Direct Intent: The agent has the full and precise intention to achieve the criminal outcome. The outcome is the purpose of their action.
• Eventual Intent: The agent, while not directly willing the outcome, foresees it as a possible consequence of their conduct and, in order to achieve their primary goal, accepts the risk. It is a "it could have happened and I accepted it."

The Court clarifies that a moral accomplice can be held liable for an attempt even if they acted with eventual intent. If a person incites or facilitates a crime, foreseeing that the criminal outcome may occur (even if not directly willing it) and accepting that risk, they will still be liable for the attempt if the crime is not completed. This extension aligns with previous case law, such as Sez. 1, no. 7350 of 1991, which already recognized the sufficiency of eventual intent for an attempt in certain circumstances.

Another crucial point of the headnote concerns "anomalous complicity" (Article 116 of the Criminal Code). The Court specifies that the act cannot be attributed to the moral accomplice under the heading of anomalous complicity. This is because, having acted with intent (even if eventual), he has already considered the more serious crime as a possible consequence of the agreed criminal conduct. Anomalous complicity occurs when the committed outcome is more serious than what the accomplices intended and is attributed to those who did not intend it. In the case at hand, if there is eventual intent, it is not an "unintended" outcome but an accepted risk, thus excluding the application of Article 116 of the Criminal Code.

Conclusions: Fundamental Clarifications for Criminal Liability

Judgment 22007/2025 of the Court of Cassation represents an important milestone in the interpretation of intent within the context of complicity and attempted crimes. It strengthens the understanding of criminal liability, extending the relevance of eventual intent to the conduct of moral participation in an attempt. This decision offers greater clarity for legal practitioners, more clearly distinguishing the different forms of intent and their implications, especially in complex scenarios where multiple individuals contribute to the realization of a crime. For citizens, it serves as a warning about the breadth of criminal liability: even the acceptance of a risk, without direct intent, can have significant legal consequences.