Commentary on Judgment Order No. 20269 of 2024: Defamation and Moral Damages

The recent order No. 20269 of July 22, 2024, issued by the Court of Cassation, addressed a crucial issue in the field of civil liability, particularly regarding defamation and compensation for moral damages. The subject of the dispute was the attribution of dishonourable conduct to a deceased family member, a delicate matter that raises both legal and moral questions.

The Case Under Review

The appellant, V., sought compensation for damages arising from the dissemination of defamatory news concerning his brother, who had passed away six years earlier. The Court of Appeal of Venice had rejected the claim for compensation, deeming the proof of damage suffered insufficient. However, the Cassation Court quashed this decision with referral, highlighting the importance of considering the presumption of moral damages in cases of defamation of deceased family members.

(MORAL DAMAGES) In general. In matters of civil liability for defamation, the prejudice of moral and reputational suffering, arising from the attribution of dishonourable and unproven conduct to deceased members of the "subsequent" (spouse and children) and "original" (parents and siblings) family, is not in re ipsa, but is presumed iuris tantum, according to ordinary evaluation, or in the absence of opposing elements which, as modifying or even impeding facts of the compensation claim, fall within the burden of proof of the perpetrator of the illicit act. (In the present case, in which the plaintiff had sued for damages resulting from the dissemination, during a radio broadcast, of defamatory news concerning his brother, who had died six years earlier, the S.C. quashed with referral the judgment of the court of appeal, which had rejected the claim, erroneously holding that there was no proof of consequential damage, in terms of the relationship between the allegedly defamed person and the claimant, without allegation and proof, that is, of circumstances capable of qualifying the said relationship between the relatives, so as to be able to hypothesise an actual prejudice, not even from the point of view of moral damage from suffering, taking into account the fact that the two brothers had an age difference of almost twenty years and had lived in different geographical areas, which would lead one to presume an autonomy of their respective spheres of life).

The Presumption of Moral Damages

The Court clarified that moral damages resulting from defamation are not automatically presumed but must be proven. However, in the absence of contrary evidence, there is a presumption iuris tantum of moral and reputational suffering. This implies that, if a family member is a victim of defamation, other family members have the right to seek compensation for the damage suffered, unless proven otherwise.

• Moral prejudice is presumed but not automatic.
• The defamer must prove the non-existence of the damage.
• The relationship between the deceased and the family members must be clearly defined.

Conclusions

This judgment marks an important step in recognising the rights of individuals who suffer moral damage due to the defamation of deceased family members. It underscores the need for careful consideration of family relationships and the damage suffered, promoting greater legal protection in sensitive contexts such as the death of a loved one. In an ever-evolving legal landscape, it is crucial for families to know that they have a right to protection even after the loss of a loved one.