RAI license fee and allocation of jurisdiction: Order no. 29608/2025 of the Joint Chambers

The complex web of jurisdictional competence in Italy often presents issues of significant practical and theoretical interest, especially regarding economic relations between public service concessionaires and the State. An emblematic case is that addressed by the Joint Chambers of the Court of Cassation in Order no. 29608 of November 10, 2025. At the heart of the dispute is the claim by the public radio and television service concessionaire, R.A.I., to be granted the full subscription fee for the year 2014, challenging the reduction mandated by law.

The regulatory context and the fee reduction

The matter originates from the application of Article 21, paragraph 4, of Decree-Law no. 66 of 2014 (converted with amendments by Law no. 89 of 2014), which provided for a reduction in the sums allocated to the concessionaire for the year 2014. The concessionaire initiated legal proceedings challenging this reduction and raising doubts regarding the constitutional legitimacy of the provision itself. The fundamental question submitted to the Joint Chambers concerned the identification of the court with jurisdiction: is this a dispute devolved to the Ordinary Court (G.O.) or the Administrative Court (G.A.)? The defense was entrusted to the well-known lawyer M. L., who argued the concessionaire's position.

The decision of the Joint Chambers and the legal principle

The Joint Chambers confirmed the jurisdiction of the ordinary court, rejecting the appeal of the State Attorney General's Office and aligning with their previous precedents. The legal principle (massima) of the decision is reported below:

The claim filed by R.A.I. in order to be granted the full fee, including for the year 2014, falls under the jurisdiction of the ordinary court, as it falls within the 'consideration' referred to in Art. 133, paragraph 1, letter c, of the Code of Administrative Procedure (c.p.a.), and the relative reduction, for the year in question, derives from a provision of law (Art. 21, paragraph 4, of D.L. no. 66 of 2014) of which constitutional illegitimacy is alleged, and not from an administrative act of a discretionary nature.

This principle is of fundamental importance as it clearly distinguishes situations in which the Public Administration acts through authoritative and discretionary measures from those in which the legal effect derives directly from a primary source, namely the law. In the present case, the reduction of the fee was not determined by a discretionary choice of the Public Administration, but by a precise legislative precept whose unconstitutionality was alleged.

Why does the dispute fall under the Ordinary Court?

The Supreme Court based its decision on several key points:

• The nature of the fee as consideration: The subscription fee falls within the 'consideration' related to the concession of public services pursuant to Article 133, paragraph 1, letter c, of the Code of Administrative Procedure (c.p.a.), for which the exclusive jurisdiction of the Administrative Court is limited, leaving purely pecuniary disputes to the Ordinary Court.
• Absence of discretionary power: The contested reduction does not derive from an administrative act expressing the discretionary power of the Public Administration, but from the direct application of a provision of law. Consequently, there is no administrative measure to be annulled, but rather a subjective pecuniary right to be protected.
• Constitutional review: The ordinary court has the full power to examine the non-manifest groundlessness of the question of constitutional legitimacy of the law and, if necessary, to refer the documents to the Constitutional Court.

Conclusions on the scope of the ruling

In conclusion, Order no. 29608/2025 reaffirms a clear boundary in the allocation of jurisdiction. When the dispute concerns subjective rights of a pecuniary nature (such as the right to receive the fee in its entirety) and the alleged injury derives directly from a provision of law rather than from a discretionary measure of the administration, judicial protection must be sought before the Ordinary Court. This ruling offers an important point of reference for professionals in the sector and for public service concessionaire companies in determining the correct judicial path to pursue.