Traffic penalties and the powers of the Deputy Prefect: Order no. 31013 of 2025 clarifies the delegation of signature

When receiving a traffic fine and deciding to appeal to the Prefect, the outcome of the administrative proceeding often takes the form of an injunction order. Many motorists, in an attempt to challenge the validity of such measures, object to the lack of proper signature, especially when the act is signed by a Deputy Prefect rather than the Prefect in person. A recent ruling by the Court of Cassation, Order no. 31013 of November 26, 2025, addresses this specific issue, establishing a fundamental principle regarding the organization and powers of the Public Administration.

The case and the appellant's challenge

The matter originated from an appeal filed by A. P. against an injunction order issued for violations of the Highway Code (Codice della Strada). The appellant argued that the measure was unlawful as it was signed by the Deputy Prefect and not the Prefect, complaining of the absence of a specific delegation of signature. Following the dismissal of the appeal by the Court of Rome in 2022, the issue reached the judges of the Supreme Court, who were called upon to clarify whether the Deputy Prefect requires an express delegation to exercise such sanctioning functions.

The decision of the Court of Cassation and the scope of the ruling

The Court of Cassation rejected the appeal, confirming the full validity of the sanctioning measure. The judges clarified that, if the Deputy Prefect is the head of the office in charge of the administrative sanctioning system, there is no need for an ad hoc delegation. The headnote of the decision is reported below:

If the Deputy Prefect is the head of the office in charge of the application of the administrative sanctioning system, injunction orders for violations of the Highway Code may be issued by him without the need for a specific delegation, as the adoption of said acts does not fall exclusively to the Prefect; therefore, the provision of Art. 14, Legislative Decree no. 139 of 2000 applies, according to which managers adopt all measures relating to the functional areas they are in charge of, so that the relative power of issuance derives directly from the law.

This principle is based on a correct interpretation of the hierarchical and functional relationship within the Prefecture. The Court of Cassation highlights that the power of the Deputy Prefect does not derive from an exceptional transfer of functions by the Prefect (which would require a delegation), but directly from the law. In particular, Legislative Decree no. 139 of 2000 grants managers the authority to adopt all administrative acts and measures that fall within their functional areas of competence.

Key points of the applied legislation

To fully understand the scope of this order, it is necessary to analyze the regulatory references that govern the organization of prefectural offices:

• Article 14 of Legislative Decree no. 139 of 2000: grants managers of the prefectural career the responsibility for management and the power to adopt acts that commit the administration to third parties in matters within their competence.
• Non-existence of an exclusive reservation: the application of Highway Code sanctions is not an exclusive and non-delegable attribution of the Prefect, but is part of the ordinary activity of the sanctioning office.
• The headship of the office: the legitimacy of the Deputy Prefect derives directly from his role as the head of the sanctioning office, making any written delegation superfluous.

Conclusions on the validity of sanctioning measures

Order no. 31013 of 2025 of the Court of Cassation represents an important point of reference for both citizens and the Public Administration. It confirms a jurisprudential trend aimed at simplifying administrative action, preventing purely formal defects or excessively rigid interpretations of organizational rules from invalidating the validity of legitimately imposed sanctions. For citizens, this means that the mere signature of the Deputy Prefect on the injunction order does not, in itself, constitute a sufficient ground to obtain the annulment of the fine during an appeal.