The Offense of Damaging Military Movable Property: Ruling 24927/2025 of the Court of Cassation Clarifies the Boundaries of Article 169 of the Code of Military Penal Law for Peace

In the landscape of military criminal law, the recent ruling no. 24927, filed on July 7, 2025, by the Court of Cassation, presided over by Dr. S. M. and reported by Dr. P. M., offers a fundamental and clarifying interpretation regarding the offense of destruction or deterioration of military movable property, governed by Article 169 of the Code of Military Penal Law for Peace. This decision, which involved A. O. as the defendant and annulled a previous ruling by the Military Court of Rome with referral, addresses a crucial issue: the actual ownership of the damaged property for the offense to be constituted. It is not always a given that property used by the military administration is also owned by it. The Court of Cassation, with this ruling, consolidates an approach aimed at protecting the efficiency and integrity of military service, extending the protective scope of the norm well beyond the mere concept of ownership.

The Crucial Distinction: Ownership or Possession?

Article 169 of the Code of Military Penal Law for Peace penalizes anyone who destroys, deteriorates, or renders unusable, in whole or in part, movable property intended for military service. The rationale behind this norm is evident: to protect the assets and essential tools for the operational capability of the Armed Forces, ensuring the continuity and efficiency of service. However, over time, the interpretative question regarding the subjective element of the property has arisen: for the offense to be constituted, is it essential that the property be owned by the military administration, or is it sufficient that the administration has possession of it, even if not full legal title? This question takes on particular relevance in a modern context where public administrations, including military ones, increasingly resort to tools such as long-term leasing or loan-for-use agreements for the acquisition of goods and services.

The Supreme Court's Position: The Principle and Its Impact

Ruling 24927/2025 of the Court of Cassation answers this question with crystal clarity, establishing a principle that strengthens the protection of military service. The Court has indeed enunciated the following legal principle:

The offense of destruction or deterioration of military movable property, as per art. 169 of the Code of Military Penal Law for Peace, may concern not only property intended for military service which the administration owns, but also that which the administration stably and continuously possesses. (Case concerning the damage to a vehicle used for military service, possessed by the administration under a long-term lease agreement).

This principle is of fundamental importance because it extends the scope of applicability of Article 169 of the Code of Military Penal Law for Peace. The Supreme Court, also referencing previous orientations (such as Section U, no. 7966 of 1980), states that ownership is not the determining factor for the offense to be constituted, but rather "stable and continuous possession." This means that, regardless of the formal legal title (ownership, lease, loan-for-use, rental), if the military administration has material and constant possession of property intended for service, and such property is damaged or destroyed, the offense under art. 169 of the Code of Military Penal Law for Peace is perfected. The case examined by the ruling, concerning the damage to a military vehicle possessed through a long-term lease agreement, is the perfect example of how this interpretation finds practical application, covering increasingly common situations in the organization of the armed forces.

Practical Implications and the Protection of Military Service

The interpretation offered by the Court of Cassation has significant practical implications. Firstly, it ensures greater and more effective protection of property used for military purposes, regardless of its formal ownership. This is essential in a context where the methods of acquisition and management of property by public administrations have become more flexible and diversified. The rationale of the norm, in fact, is not so much to protect the State's property rights, but rather to safeguard the functionality and operational capability of military service, which would be compromised by the damage to any property intended for it, whether owned or simply possessed. Among the properties protected by Article 169 of the Code of Military Penal Law for Peace are, by way of example:

• Weapons and ammunition;
• Individual and collective equipment;
• Vehicles and means of transport (land, air, naval);
• Mobile infrastructure and instrumental assets;
• Technological instruments and communication systems.

The Court, with this ruling, reiterates that protection extends to all instruments that concretely contribute to the performance of the institutional tasks of the Armed Forces.

Conclusions: A Step Forward in the Protection of Military Assets

Ruling no. 24927 of 2025 by the Court of Cassation represents a firm point and an important confirmation for the interpretation of Article 169 of the Code of Military Penal Law for Peace. By reiterating that "stable and continuous possession" is sufficient to constitute the offense of destruction or deterioration of military movable property, the Supreme Court ensures that criminal protection extends to all property actually used for service, even if not exclusively owned by the administration. This decision is a clear signal of the judiciary's commitment to ensuring the efficiency and security of the Armed Forces, adapting the application of norms to modern organizational and contractual needs. For legal professionals and all those involved in the military sphere, this decision provides valuable guidance and reinforces awareness of the importance of preserving every resource dedicated to defense and the maintenance of peace.