Driving licence suspension is one of the most feared and burdensome accessory penalties for those who commit traffic violations. However, its application is not always straightforward, especially when both administrative and criminal judgments are involved. The recent ruling by the Criminal Court of Cassation, judgment no. 19433 of 08/04/2025 (filed on 24/05/2025), presided over by Dr. U. B. and with Dr. F. A. as rapporteur, offers a fundamental clarification on the relationship between these different types of sanctions, introducing a principle of great importance for the protection of citizens.
In our legal system, driving licence suspension can be ordered by both the administrative authority (the Prefect, as a precautionary or definitive measure) and the criminal judge as an accessory penalty following a road traffic offence. This dual track can generate confusion and, potentially, excessive hardship for the defendant, as in the case of S. N., whose appeal was rejected by the preliminary investigations judge of the Court of Busto Arsizio. The Court of Cassation intervenes precisely to harmonise these applications, referring to Articles 186 and 223 of the Highway Code, which govern driving under the influence of alcohol and accessory penalties resulting from road traffic offences, respectively.
In matters of road traffic, the application of driving licence suspension by the administrative authority does not preclude the imposition of the accessory suspension penalty by the judge in criminal proceedings, except for the necessity, where the latter is determined to be of a longer duration, to deduct, in the execution phase, the period already served.
The above maxim is at the heart of the Supreme Court's decision. In simple terms, this means that if an individual undergoes a driving licence suspension administratively (for example, immediately after a check for driving under the influence of alcohol) and is subsequently convicted in criminal proceedings for the same act, the criminal judge is still free to impose their own accessory penalty of driving licence suspension. However, and this is the crucial point, if the suspension ordered by the criminal judge is of a longer duration than that already served administratively, the period already "pre-served" must be deducted. This deduction mechanism, which takes place in the execution phase, is intended to prevent the citizen from being punished twice for the same period and ensures a principle of proportionality and substantive justice.
The Cassation Court's judgment is based on a principle of legal civilisation: while acknowledging the legitimacy of a dual sanctioning intervention (administrative and criminal), it is concerned with avoiding unjust duplication or disproportionate aggravation of the penalty. The jurisprudential precedent is consolidated, as demonstrated by the references to conforming judgments no. 18920 of 2013, no. 47955 of 2004, and no. 20 of 2000. The objective is twofold:
This interpretation aims to protect citizens from excessive burdens, ensuring that the application of sanctions is always oriented towards proportionality and reasonableness, in line with constitutional principles and European regulations protecting fundamental rights.
Judgment no. 19433 of 2025 by the Criminal Court of Cassation represents a firm point in road traffic law and driving licence suspension jurisprudence. It definitively clarifies that the administrative and judicial authorities can act independently, but with an essential corrective: the period of suspension already served administratively must always be deducted from the accessory criminal penalty, should the latter be of longer duration. This principle is fundamental for all those facing criminal proceedings for road traffic offences, as it ensures that the final calculation of the penalty is fair and proportionate. To avoid unpleasant surprises and ensure the correct application of these principles, it is always advisable to seek the assistance of legal professionals experienced in criminal law and road traffic law.