Unlawful influence trafficking may concern you if you have paid, promised or received compensation linked to relations with a public official. The borderline with lawful consulting does not depend on the name given to the assignment: what matters is the relationship actually used, the purpose of the payment and the outcome the parties intend to achieve.
I will explain what elements Article 346-bis of the criminal code currently requires, why even those who give or promise the benefit can be punished and what changes compared to the former false claims of influence. We will also examine how to distinguish the transparent representation of interests from the sale of personal influence and which aspects deserve attention when an allegation involves consultants, intermediaries, businesses or professionals.
Knowing a public official is not enough. Since August 25, 2024, Article 346-bis of the criminal code requires the intentional use, precisely to carry out the unlawful agreement, of an existing relationship with a public official, a person entrusted with a public service or one of the international subjects referred to in Article 322-bis of the criminal code.
The intermediary must obtain or have promised, for themselves or for another person, money or another economic benefit. The payment must serve, alternatively, to remunerate the public agent in relation to their functions or to carry out the specific unlawful mediation defined by the law. The current discipline derives from Law no. 114 of August 9, 2024, available in the text of the reform on Normattiva.
The promise may be sufficient. It is not necessary to wait for payment, intervention at the office or achievement of the advantage. However, all other elements of the fact must be present, including the content of the agreement: a vague conversation, an institutional presentation or a normal professional assignment do not acquire a criminal nature simply because they involve a public administration.
The existing relationship is a central requirement. A real relationship is required that the intermediary can use towards the public agent. It may derive from professional, political, administrative or personal contacts, but simple acquaintance is not unlawful: it must be intentionally employed as an instrument of the agreement described by Article 346-bis.
For the consultant, the concrete distinction often concerns what is promised to the client. It is one thing to explain a procedure, prepare observations, organize a transparent meeting or represent interests through technical arguments. It is another to ask for money claiming that one's personal closeness will allow paying the official or inducing them to commit an offence contrary to official duties.
The reform also requires an economic benefit. A fee, a future assignment, an asset, a discount or an economically appreciable advantage may be relevant, but the economic nature alone does not prove the offence. The benefit must be linked to the relationship used and to one of the unlawful purposes provided for by the rule.
The first hypothesis concerns the remuneration of the public agent in relation to the exercise of their functions. Money is given or promised to the intermediary so that it may be destined, directly or indirectly, to the official. The offence may materialize before the latter receives anything or participates in the agreement.
If the public agent adheres to the unlawful pact, the qualification may shift towards the offences of bribery. Article 346-bis operates in fact outside the cases of complicity in the offences referred to in its initial clause. The decisive point is who participates in the agreement, what is promised and in exchange for what public activity.
The second hypothesis is more circumscribed. Mediation must aim to induce the public agent to perform an act contrary to official duties that constitutes an offence in itself and from which an undue advantage may derive. The three elements are cumulative: contrariety to duties, criminal nature of the act and possible undue advantage.
Not every pressure, recommendation or inopportune request therefore falls within the current Article 346-bis. Constitutional Court judgment no. 185 of 2025 reconstructed the restrictive scope of the reform and deemed unfounded the question referring to the obligations of the Strasbourg Convention. The decision does not render other conduct lawful; it confirms that the allegation must respect the requirements established by law today.
The professional fee is lawful when it remunerates real and permitted activities: study of the case, technical assistance, preparation of documents, transparent institutional communication or dialogue carried out in compliance with applicable rules. Even possessing a network of contacts does not automatically turn the consultant into an unlawful intermediary.
The risk emerges when the fee does not pay for a recognizable professional service, but rather for the covert use of a personal relationship to remunerate the public agent or to orient them towards a criminal act. Phrases such as “I am paying the right person”, “the decision is guaranteed” or “part of it goes to the official” become relevant together with the context, payments and communications; they do not constitute automatically decisive formulas if isolated or misunderstood.
Contract, technical report and invoice help reconstruct the activity, but the formal document does not neutralize an unlawful pact. A generic invoice may hide prohibited mediation; conversely, the absence of a perfect description does not prove the offence on its own, if the lawful activities are concretely performed and the payment finds a coherent explanation.
To reduce ambiguity, the assignment should indicate services, recipients, contact methods and the criterion for the fee. It is prudent to avoid promises of results depending on the will of the public agent, sums destined for unidentified subjects and non-traceable payments. Documentary transparency serves to show the real content of the activity, not to build an appearance.
Both sides of the agreement are punished. Imprisonment from one year and six months to four years and six months applies both to the intermediary who unduly has an economic benefit given or promised and to the person who gives or promises it. The latter cannot therefore be automatically considered a victim simply because they have no direct relations with the public agent.
The penalty is increased if the intermediary holds the qualification of public official, person entrusted with a public service or one of the international qualifications referred to by the rule. It is also increased for facts connected to judicial activities and in the aggravated hypothesis of remuneration of the public agent for an act contrary to duties, or for the omission or delay of an official act. The official publication of Law no. 114 of 2024 also reports these amendments.
Distinct reward-based legal mechanisms exist. Article 323-bis of the criminal code contemplates a reduction for facts of particularly minor nature and, from one third to two thirds, for certain effective collaborative conduct. Article 323-ter provides for a cause of non-punishability subject to rigorous requirements: voluntary reporting before knowing of investigations against oneself and in any case within four months from the fact, useful and concrete indications, as well as making the benefit available or performing the substitute obligations provided. It is not a choice to improvise.
False claims of influence is no longer an autonomous offence. Article 346 of the criminal code was repealed by Law no. 3 of 2019. At the same time, the previous wording of Article 346-bis had extended influence trafficking to relations not only existing, but also merely vaunted or asserted.
However, the succession did not produce a complete overlap. The Joint Sections of the Supreme Court of Cassation, in judgment no. 19357 of 2024, excluded that the false representation of a non-existent relationship, used to deceive the payer, always converged into influence trafficking. In the presence of artifice or deception, error and patrimonial performance, the fact may constitute fraud, provided that the relative elements are alleged and ascertained.
Since August 25, 2024, the text is even clearer: Article 346-bis requires existing relationships. Whoever completely invents the relationship with the official remains outside this specific legal provision, but is not automatically exempt from liability for this reason. Fraud or other offences may come into play, depending on how the payment was obtained.
The date of the fact is therefore essential. For prior conduct, it is necessary to compare the wordings that followed one another in 2012, 2019 and 2024, applying the rules on the more favorable criminal law. The modification of the rule does not automatically cancel every conviction: Supreme Court of Cassation, judgment no. 5041 of 2025, clarified in a specific case that it is necessary to verify whether the conduct retains criminal relevance according to another current provision.
The first verification concerns the content of the agreement. It is necessary to separate the fee for lawful activities from the possible price of influence, identify who was to receive the benefit and understand what conduct was requested of the public agent. Ambiguous expressions acquire meaning only if read together with behaviors, the temporal sequence and the destination of payments.
A second hurdle is the actual existence of the relationship. If the relationship with the official was invented, the current Article 346-bis does not apply for that reason, but any deception must be examined. If the relationship existed, it must still be proven that it was intentionally used for the unlawful purpose: mere acquaintance remains insufficient.
To prepare the defensive confrontation, the assignment contract, consulting products, complete communications, invoices, traceability of payments and meeting requests are useful. It is important to preserve the data in their original context, without deletions, modifications or direct contacts aimed at agreeing versions with other people involved.
Options change according to the procedural moment and the facts. It may be necessary to contest the absence of an element of the offence, propose a different legal qualification, evaluate the effects of the succession of laws or timely verify the prerequisites of Articles 323-bis and 323-ter. None of these paths depends on an abstract label: the decision must start from what actually happened.
No, not automatically. The offence requires that the existing relationship be intentionally used to obtain the economic benefit destined to remunerate the public agent or to carry out the specific unlawful mediation provided by law. Real, transparent consulting directed at permitted activities remains distinct from the sale of an unlawful intervention.
Yes, the base penalty is the same provided for the intermediary. Whoever pays is not automatically a victim. The position changes when the money is obtained through deception about a non-existent relationship: in the presence of the elements of fraud, the person paying may be considered the deceived party.
It is not necessary for the payment to reach the official. The agreement between the intermediary and the person who gives or promises the benefit can integrate the offence before the public agent's intervention. If the latter knowingly adheres to the pact, however, influence trafficking must be distinguished from bribery provisions.
The more favorable rule can affect prior facts, according to the rules of the succession of criminal laws. It is necessary to compare the concrete fact with the different wordings. For a final conviction, revocation requires that the fact is no longer provided as an offence; a change in the name or perimeter of the provision is not enough.
No, Article 323-ter sets rigorous conditions. The report must be voluntary, prior to the knowledge of investigations and in any case presented within four months from the fact; it must also offer useful and concrete elements and respect the conditions relating to the benefit. It is an exceptional possibility to be evaluated before taking irreversible initiatives.