GPS localization can play an important role in criminal proceedings because it seems to offer a simple answer: a device, a vehicle, or a telephone is in a certain area at a certain time. That data alone, however, does not prove everything the prosecution attributes to it. Doubts may arise regarding its acquisition, the precision of the map, the continuity of the track, or the connection between the localized device and the investigated person.
I will explain which distinctions truly matter when you want to challenge a localization piece of evidence. We will see why not all data called "GPS" follows the same rules, when an issue of inadmissibility may arise, and when, conversely, the discussion primarily concerns the track's capacity to prove the contested fact.
The first question is where the data comes from. A satellite tracker used during investigative activities, position data contained in telephone billing records, app history, or the logs of a platform installed on a company vehicle are not the same piece of evidence. They may all refer to movements, but they have a different origin and require different verifications.
GPS allows a device to calculate its position through satellite signals. In the case file, however, that result may appear as an original file, a sequence of coordinates, a judicial police report, a screenshot, or a subsequently processed map. A map is a representation of the data, not always the original data itself. To understand its weight, one must distinguish what the system recorded from what was subsequently reconstructed or summarized.
A track may indicate that a telephone, a vehicle, or a device was in an area; it does not automatically identify who was using it. The position of the device and personal presence are different facts. If a car is shared, a telephone is left inside the vehicle, or the device can be moved by others, the transition from technical data to individual attribution requires additional elements.
GPS installed or used by investigators should not be confused with data requested from a telephone operator. The Court of Cassation, in ruling no. 37395 of 2024, classified the localization of movements via GPS satellite system, the so-called electronic shadowing, as an atypical means of searching for evidence. In the same ruling, it excluded the analogical application of the rules established for telephone billing records. The passage is reported in the criminal review of the Court of Cassation relating to ruling no. 37395/2024.
This means that the absence of the decree required for acquiring billing records does not, on its own, render investigative GPS shadowing inadmissible. A challenge based solely on the absence of judicial authorization therefore risks applying rules that concern a different source of evidence.
This does not prevent discussing the value of the localization. For example, the period covered by the monitoring, the documentation of the operations, the frequency of detections, any intervals lacking recordings, and the possibility of attributing the vehicle to a specific person remain relevant. The regularity of acquisition and the probative force of the track are separate issues.
Data held by a communications provider follow specific rules. Article 132 of the Privacy Code regulates the acquisition of telephone and telematic traffic data retained by providers for criminal purposes. The text reproduced in the Official Journal of January 15, 2026 provides, upon the occurrence of the conditions indicated by the law, for the judge's authorization by reasoned decree, upon request by the public prosecutor or upon application by the authorized parties. You can consult the text of Article 132 reported in the Official Journal.
The rule requires sufficient evidence for crimes punished with life imprisonment or with imprisonment of not less than three years in the maximum, calculated pursuant to Article 4 of the code of criminal procedure; it also contemplates specific hypotheses of serious telephone threat, harassment, or disturbance. Not every investigation therefore allows for the indiscriminate acquisition of billing records and localization data. Both the type of crime and the utility of the data for establishing the facts are relevant.
In cases of urgency, the public prosecutor may order acquisition by reasoned decree when delay could cause serious prejudice to the investigations; the measure must be communicated to the judge within forty-eight hours, and the judge decides on validation within the subsequent forty-eight hours. Article 132 also establishes that data acquired in violation of the rules of paragraphs 3 and 3-bis cannot be used.
The Court of Cassation applied this distinction to geolocation contained in billing records: with ruling no. 15836 of 2023, it deemed unusable, even in summary proceedings, data acquired by the judicial police without the authorization decree required by Article 132, paragraph 3. The official fact sheet of ruling no. 15836/2023 allows for verifying the subject matter and the principle expressed by the Court.
Inadmissibility concerns the manner in which evidence was acquired. Article 191 of the code of criminal procedure establishes that evidence acquired in violation of prohibitions established by law cannot be used and that the flaw can also be raised ex officio at any stage and degree of proceedings. The reference is the text of Article 191 of the code of criminal procedure.
Therefore, it is not enough for a map to be concise or for a report not to describe every technical detail. Unpersuasive data is not automatically prohibited data. If inadmissibility is argued, it is necessary to identify a legal rule applicable to the specific acquisition and explain how it was violated.
Reliability, on the other hand, concerns what the data can truly demonstrate. A coordinate may be useful to place a vehicle on a road or in an area; it may not be sufficient to state that the vehicle was in front of a specific entrance, that its user was present, or that they committed the contested action. The required precision depends on the conclusion the prosecution wishes to draw.
The temporal sequence can also change the reasoning. Two detections twenty minutes apart can indicate departure and arrival points, but do not necessarily describe the route, stops, or who held the device during that interval. A dense and continuous recording offers greater information, but must still be read together with the other elements of the proceedings.
A technical challenge is useful only if it impacts a concrete step in the reconstruction. The apparatus identifier, the date and time of each detection, the time zone used, the frequency of recordings, and the possible existence of original files are important. An isolated screenshot does not always allow checking whether there were signal gaps, modifications, or subsequent processing.
Geographical precision deserves attention proportionate to the case. In an urban area, the difference between being near a building and being at a precise point can be decisive; in a reconstruction concerning only a large area, however, that same difference may have a minor impact. It is not the word "GPS" that establishes data precision, but the system employed and the use made of it in the trial.
Another point concerns the chain of reasoning. If the prosecution localizes a vehicle, it still must prove who was driving it; if it localizes a telephone, it must explain why that telephone was available to the person concerned; if it localizes an app, it must clarify who could access the relevant account. The leap from the device to the person cannot be taken for granted.
The challenge must start from the fact that the data is supposed to prove. If the source is a billing record obtained from a provider, the first point can be compliance with Article 132: crime being proceeded for, measure adopted, urgency and validation, when invoked. If the source is investigative satellite shadowing, the documentation of the activity and the track's capacity to demonstrate the specific contested circumstance take on greater relevance.
When the source is private, such as a fleet management platform or an app, one cannot automatically transfer the rules of police GPS shadowing or those of telephone billing records. First, it is necessary to understand who collected the data, what system generated it, what was handed over to investigators, and whether the material allows reconstructing the path from the original recording to its production in the case file.
To prepare a useful comparison, few but precise elements are needed: the type of localized device, the document describing the acquisition, the contested time interval, the form in which data was produced, and the facts connecting the device to the person. These data allow choosing between a challenge of lawfulness, a technical critique, or both.
No, not always. The answer depends on the data source. For satellite shadowing carried out by investigators, the Court of Cassation excluded the automatic application of billing record rules. For localization data contained in telephone or telematic billing records, however, Article 132 requires judicial authorization, barring urgent procedure with subsequent validation.
No, it localizes a device first of all. A GPS may refer to a vehicle, a telephone, or a dedicated device. To attribute that presence to a person, concrete elements regarding the availability and actual use of the device are needed. The exclusive nature of the vehicle, access to keys, and other compatible data can significantly change the assessment.
The map must be traceable to the data it represents. It matters to know whether coordinates, times, and original logs exist, whether there are intervals lacking detections, and how the graphical representation was built. A clear summary can be useful, but it does not eliminate the problem of verifying the continuity and meaning of the track.
Yes, if precision is decisive for the prosecution. Discussing whether a vehicle was in a large area versus exactly at a specific point does not carry the same weight. The challenge must indicate which conclusion is not supported by available data: presence in a building, a particular stop, a journey, or a restricted time interval.
No, not according to Court of Cassation ruling no. 15836/2023. The Court held that the inadmissibility of geolocation data contained in billing records acquired without the decree required by Article 132 is not remedied by choosing summary proceedings. It is still necessary to establish whether the discussed data truly belongs to this category and whether the indicated flaw occurs.
The useful question is not whether GPS is always valid or never valid. One must distinguish the source of localization, the rule governing its acquisition, the fact it is supposed to demonstrate, and the elements necessary to connect the device to the person. When localization plays a central role in the prosecution, you can contact me to frame the available documentation and evaluate a defense line consistent with the type of evidence.