European Arrest Warrant and the Principle of Speciality: Cassation Ruling 22045/2025

In the realm of international judicial cooperation, the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) is a fundamental tool for combating transnational crime. However, its application often raises complex issues, particularly concerning the rights of the surrendered person and the so-called principle of speciality. The Court of Cassation has intervened on this delicate balance with Ruling No. 22045 of 14/05/2025 (filed on 11/06/2025), a decision that warrants careful analysis for its significant practical and legal implications.

This decision, presided over by Dr. V. G. and authored by Dr. A. G., addresses the issue of prosecutability for offences not included in the surrender request but committed prior to it, when the surrendered person has requested a simplified trial procedure. Let's examine the details of this important ruling.

The European Arrest Warrant and the Principle of Speciality: A Necessary Context

The European Arrest Warrant, regulated in Italy by Law No. 69 of April 22, 2005, is a judicial measure issued by a Member State of the European Union for the arrest and surrender, by another Member State, of a person for the purpose of criminal proceedings or the execution of a custodial sentence or measure. One of the pillars of this system is the principle of speciality, enshrined in Article 27 of Law No. 69/2005 (which implements Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA) and, generally, in international treaties such as the International Treaty of 13/12/1957.

Under this principle, the surrendered person cannot be prosecuted, convicted, or deprived of personal liberty for an offence other than that for which they were surrendered, if committed before the surrender. This principle aims to protect the surrendered person from surprise or "dragnet" proceedings, ensuring that their surrender is for well-defined reasons. However, the same legislation provides for exceptions, including the consent of the surrendered person to waive this guarantee.

The Specific Case and the Cassation Ruling 22045/2025

The case examined by the Cassation concerned the defendant N. A., for whom a European Arrest Warrant had been issued. The central issue revolved around the possibility of proceeding against her also for an offence not explicitly mentioned in the surrender request, but committed before it and for which N. A. was already subject to a restrictive personal liberty measure. The Court of Appeal of Florence had rejected a previous request, bringing the matter to the attention of the Supreme Court.

The Cassation, with ruling 22045/2025, provided a clear interpretation of how consent to derogate from the principle of speciality can be manifested. The key takeaway from this ruling, of fundamental importance, states:

In matters of procedural European Arrest Warrants, the unequivocal certainty of the surrendered person's consent to be prosecuted for an offence committed prior to surrender, for which they are subject to a restrictive personal liberty measure, can be inferred from the conduct of the aforementioned who has requested the conclusion of the trial through a simplified procedure, without previously raising an objection regarding the violation of the principle of speciality. This manifestation of will implies a waiver of the right to assert their occasional exemption from national jurisdiction in court.

This ruling clarifies that the consent of the surrendered person to be tried for additional offences does not necessarily need to be expressed explicitly or formally. It can, in fact, be inferred from unequivocal procedural conduct, such as requesting a simplified trial procedure. The Cassation emphasizes that the act of requesting an alternative procedure, without raising the objection of violation of the principle of speciality, implies a tacit but firm waiver of this guarantee.

Implications of Requesting a Simplified Trial Procedure

The simplified trial procedure, provided for by Article 438 et seq. of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is a special proceeding that allows for the conclusion of the trial at an early stage, based on the investigation records, and offers the defendant a reduced sentence in case of conviction. The choice to opt for this procedure is a strategic and conscious decision, which entails the acceptance of certain procedural conditions.

According to the Supreme Court, when a defendant surrendered via EAW opts for the simplified trial procedure without raising objections regarding the principle of speciality for additional offences, they are implicitly manifesting their willingness to submit to the jurisdiction of the requesting State even for those offences. This conduct is interpreted as a waiver of the right to invoke exemption from national jurisdiction for offences not included in the original surrender request. Law 69/2005, in Article 26, specifically provides that consent to derogate from the principle of speciality can be expressed by the surrendered person before the judicial authority of the executing State.

In summary, the key points of this decision can be summarized as follows:

• The principle of speciality in EAWs is derogable with the consent of the surrendered person.
• Such consent does not require a specific form and can be implicit.
• Requesting a simplified trial procedure, if not accompanied by an objection regarding the principle of speciality, constitutes an unequivocal manifestation of such consent.
• This implies a waiver of the right to assert exemption from jurisdiction in court for additional offences committed prior to surrender.

Conclusions: A Balance Between Cooperation and Guarantees

Ruling 22045/2025 by the Cassation represents an important clarification in the field of European judicial cooperation. It reinforces the idea that the procedural choices of the defendant, if conscious and not promptly contested, can have significant repercussions on their rights and the guarantees offered by the system. The ruling emphasizes the need for defence counsel to carefully evaluate every procedural step, especially in contexts of European Arrest Warrants, where the intersections between different legal systems can generate unexpected complexities. It is an invitation to carefully weigh defence strategies, balancing the opportunity of alternative procedures with the safeguarding of the surrendered person's fundamental guarantees.