Criminal law is a constantly evolving field, where the protection of fundamental rights and the effectiveness of judicial action must find a balance. One of the most debated and applied personal precautionary measures, especially in sensitive contexts such as domestic violence or stalking, is the prohibition of approaching places frequented by the offended person, governed by Article 282-ter of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But what are the limits of this measure and, above all, who has the power to precisely define the places to be interdicted? The Court of Cassation, with Judgment No. 22386 of 2025, has provided a fundamental clarification, establishing a firm point on the interpretation of the powers of the judicial police in the execution of such a provision. Let's examine the implications of this important ruling together.
The prohibition of approach, introduced into our legal system to strengthen the protection of victims of specific crimes, requires the suspect or defendant not to approach certain places habitually frequented by the offended person, such as their home, workplace, schools, or other places of social interaction. This measure is aimed at preventing the repetition of harmful or harassing conduct, ensuring a safe environment for the victim. Its application is ordered by the judge, who assesses the existence of serious evidence of guilt and the precautionary needs, specifying in the provision the places to which the subject cannot approach.
It is a safeguard of legal civilization that aims to interrupt vicious cycles of violence and intimidation. However, the effectiveness of this measure strictly depends on its correct application and compliance with the principles of legality and specificity that inform our criminal system, starting from Article 13 of the Constitution, which protects personal liberty.
The crucial issue addressed by the Court of Cassation in judgment No. 22386 of 2025 concerned precisely the scope of intervention of the judicial police delegated to execute the prohibition of approach. Often, in practice, situations arise where judicial police officers, in an attempt to make the measure more effective or to clarify its contours, provide the recipient with additional or different instructions than those established by the judge. But is such conduct legitimate?
In the matter of personal precautionary measures, the judicial police, delegated to execute the prohibition of approaching places frequented by the offended person, cannot indicate to the recipient places different from or additional to those indicated in the precautionary provision, but may, if necessary, specify their geographical location. (In its reasoning, the Court clarified that such anomalous prescriptions, not concerning the precautionary provision itself but its execution, cannot be challenged with the remedy of review, but only through a request addressed to the judge who ordered the measure).
This ruling is of paramount importance. The Supreme Court has clearly outlined the operational perimeter of the judicial police: it has an executive role, not a discretionary one regarding the identification of places. In other words, the judicial police cannot expand the scope of the prohibition, nor add new places that have not been expressly provided for by the judge in the precautionary provision. The power of specification is limited to the "geographical location" of the already indicated places, meaning clarifying precisely where they are located, without modifying or increasing their number or type. This means, for example, that if the judge has prohibited approaching the offended person's "workplace," the judicial police can indicate the exact address of the office, but cannot add the "bar downstairs" if it was not mentioned in the provision.
The underlying principle is that of the reservation of law and jurisdiction: only the judge, based on the law (Art. 282-ter c.p.p.), can impose limitations on personal liberty. The judicial police is an operational arm that must act in compliance with judicial decisions, without introducing modifications that would alter the substance of the precautionary measure.
Judgment No. 22386 of 2025 not only establishes the limits of the judicial police but also offers a valuable indication of the remedies available in case of exceeding prescriptions. The Court has indeed clarified that such "anomalous prescriptions," as they relate to the execution and not the merits of the precautionary measure, cannot be challenged through an appeal for review (Art. 309 c.p.p.).
Review, in fact, is the procedural tool aimed at challenging the legitimacy and foundation of the precautionary measure itself, i.e., whether there were grounds for ordering it. If the problem concerns the execution, i.e., a distorted interpretation or application by the judicial police, the correct path is a request directed to the judge who issued the measure. This mechanism ensures that it is always the judicial authority, the guardian of rights and guarantees, that resolves issues relating to the implementation of its own provisions. It is a principle of coherence and hierarchy of sources that ensures the full protection of the defendant's rights.
To summarize the key points for those in a similar situation, it is useful to keep in mind that:
Judgment No. 22386 of 2025 by the Court of Cassation represents an important piece in the mosaic of procedural and substantive guarantees. It reiterates a fundamental principle of our legal system: personal liberty can only be limited in the ways and cases provided for by law and by a reasoned order of the judicial authority. The judicial police, while playing an essential role, must operate within the boundaries set by the judge, without encroaching on decision-making areas that are precluded to it.
This ruling is a warning to legal professionals and a valuable guide for anyone involved in proceedings involving personal precautionary measures. It ensures that the execution of a measure such as the prohibition of approach always occurs in compliance with the law and the prerogatives of the judge, thus safeguarding both the effectiveness of the protection of the offended person and the fundamental rights of the suspect or defendant. It is a delicate balance, but indispensable for a state of law.