Danger of Reiteration of Offence: The Court of Cassation (Judgment no. 22344/2025) Clarifies Imminence in Precautionary Measures

The Italian criminal justice system, in balancing personal liberty with the need to protect the community, assigns a central role to precautionary measures. These are not anticipatory convictions but tools aimed at preventing certain dangerous situations during proceedings. Among the fundamental requirements for their application, the so-called "danger of reiteration of the offence" stands out, meaning the risk that the suspect or defendant may commit new crimes. But what exactly does "imminence" of this danger mean? The Court of Cassation, with its recent Judgment no. 22344 of March 5, 2025 (filed on June 13, 2025), has provided a fundamental clarification, rejecting an appeal filed within proceedings involving A. Fabbrocino and confirming a jurisprudential orientation of great importance for legal practice.

This ruling, drafted by Dr. M. Brancaccio and presided over by Dr. A. Guardiano, is crucial for understanding how judges should assess the persistence of a criminal risk and how "imminent" it must be to justify the restriction of personal liberty. Let's delve into the meaning of this decision and its implications.

The Heart of the Matter: Imminence of the Danger of Reiteration

Article 274, paragraph 1, letter c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes that personal precautionary measures may be ordered when there is a concrete and imminent danger that the defendant will commit serious crimes involving the use of weapons or other means of personal violence, or with the aim of terrorism or subversion of the constitutional order, or organised crime offences, or offences of the same kind as the one being prosecuted. The concept of "imminence" has, over time, been subject to different interpretations, generating considerable application uncertainty. Was a generic risk sufficient, or was there a near certainty of an impending new criminal conduct required?

The Court of Cassation's judgment intervenes precisely on this point, providing an interpretative compass that departs from a restrictive and purely temporal view. The Court reiterated that imminence does not translate into a mere prediction of an immediate opportunity to offend, but rather into a more complex and prognostic assessment.

In matters of personal precautionary measures, the requirement of imminence of the danger provided for by art. 274, paragraph 1, letter c), of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not equivalent to the immediacy of specific opportunities to relapse into crime and requires, instead, on the part of the judge overseeing the precautionary measure, a prognostic assessment of the possibility of reiterative conduct, based on an accurate analysis of the concrete case, taking into account the methods of commission of the conduct, the personality of the subject, and the socio-environmental context, which must be all the more thorough the greater the temporal distance from the facts, but not also the prediction of specific occasions for recidivism.

This maxim is of fundamental importance. It tells us that the judge must not wait for a specific "opportunity" for the suspect to commit a new crime to materialise. Rather, they are called upon to conduct a "prognostic assessment," i.e., a prediction of the future based on concrete and current elements. This is not a crystal ball, but a rigorous analysis that considers several factors:

• The methods of the conduct: How was the crime being prosecuted committed? Were they particularly violent, organised, or indicative of pronounced social dangerousness?
• The personality of the subject: What is the defendant's psychological and behavioural profile? Are there prior convictions? Have they shown signs of disregard for rules or an inability to self-control?
• The socio-environmental context: In what environment does the defendant live? Are there external factors (e.g., associations, economic conditions, family situations) that could facilitate the reiteration of the offence?

The Court further emphasises that this analysis must be "all the more thorough the greater the temporal distance from the facts." This means that if the alleged crime occurred a long time ago, the judge must be even more meticulous in demonstrating the imminence of the danger, not being able to rely solely on the gravity of the historical fact, but seeking more recent elements that attest to the persistence of dangerousness.

Practical Implications and Protection of Rights

The interpretation offered by the Court of Cassation, while not equating imminence with immediacy, does not diminish the protective scope of the requirement. On the contrary, it makes it more concrete and aligned with reality. It is not about justifying precautionary measures based on mere suppositions, but about requiring the judge to undertake a solid argumentative process anchored in objective and current data. The decision of the Tribunal of Liberty of Salerno, subsequently rejected by the Court of Cassation, evidently did not fully convince on this front.

This approach is in line with the constitutional principles of personal liberty (art. 13 of the Constitution) and the presumption of innocence (art. 27 of the Constitution), which mandate the application of precautionary measures as an extrema ratio, only when strictly necessary and with impeccable reasoning. The prognostic assessment must be calibrated to the specific case, avoiding automatisms and generalisations.

Conclusions

Judgment no. 22344 of 2025 by the Court of Cassation represents a firm point in the complex matter of personal precautionary measures. By reiterating that the imminence of the danger of reiteration is not synonymous with the immediacy of specific opportunities to offend, but requires a prognostic assessment based on an in-depth analysis of the concrete case, the defendant's personality, and their socio-environmental context, the Supreme Court offers clarity and rigour. This orientation ensures that the restriction of personal liberty is always supported by an effective and current risk, protecting the rights of the defendant and, at the same time, the community's need for security, in a delicate but essential balance for a fair trial.