In the complex landscape of Italian criminal procedural law, formalities hold paramount importance, especially when it comes to safeguarding the fundamental rights of the accused. Among these, judicial act notifications play a primary role, being the means by which an individual is informed of the charges against them and the stages of the proceedings. But what happens when a notification, even if not perfectly compliant with the rules, does not prevent the accused from actively participating in the trial? The Supreme Court of Cassation, with Judgment No. 24976 of 2025 (filed on July 7, 2025), has provided an important clarification on this delicate balance between form and substance, reaffirming a fundamental principle for the protection of the right to defense.
Notifications, governed by Articles 157 et seq. of the Code of Criminal Procedure, are the cornerstone for ensuring that the accused is fully informed and can exercise their right to defense. The decree ordering the trial is a document of crucial importance, as it marks the commencement of the trial phase and requires the accused to be aware of the charges brought against them. To ensure maximum effectiveness and certainty, the law provides that the accused may elect a domicile (often at their trusted lawyer's office) where all procedural documents are to be served. However, judicial reality can present nuances, and notifications do not always occur at the designated location.
The case that led to the ruling of the Court of Cassation, presided over by Dr. D. S. P. and with Dr. I. M. as rapporteur and author, concerned an accused, Mr. M. G., whose notification of the decree ordering the trial had been carried out at a location other than the elected domicile. Instead of at the office of his trusted lawyer, the notification had taken place at the accused's place of residence, through the deposit of the envelope at the municipal office and subsequent notices. This method, while not the primary one provided for in the presence of an elected domicile, had not prevented Mr. M. G. from actively participating in the proceedings, even submitting to examination. In this context, the defense counsel had not raised any objection regarding the regularity of the notification. On this point, the Supreme Court expressed a cardinal principle:
The notification of the decree ordering the trial at a location other than the domicile elected by the accused constitutes a relative nullity, where it does not preclude effective knowledge of the act, which is remedied if not timely objected to or if the accused has participated in the proceedings and exercised their defense rights. (In this case, the accused, despite the notification being served at their place of residence through deposit of the envelope at the municipal office and related notices, instead of at the office of their domiciled trusted lawyer, had participated in the trial, even submitting to examination, without the defense counsel having raised any objection).
This maxim crystallizes a fundamental principle: the effective knowledge of the act and the accused's participation in the proceedings are elements that can overcome a formal defect in the notification. The Court, in fact, rejected the accused's appeal, upholding the decision of the Court of Appeal of Naples of January 8, 2025.
The judgment under review is part of the broader context of procedural nullities, distinguishing between absolute nullities (the most serious, irremediable, and to be raised ex officio at any stage of the proceedings, pursuant to art. 178 and 179 c.p.p.) and relative nullities (less serious, remediable, and which must be objected to in a timely manner, pursuant to art. 183 c.p.p.). Notification at a location other than the elected domicile, while an irregularity, does not constitute an absolute nullity if it has not prevented the accused from effectively knowing the act. In such cases, a relative nullity arises, which can be remedied in various circumstances, as provided for by art. 184 c.p.p. and reiterated by constant case law (see United Sections No. 119 of 2005):
In Mr. M. G.'s case, his active participation in the trial, including the decision to submit to examination, effectively remedied the defect in the notification. This is because the Italian criminal procedural system, while rigorous in its formalities, is oriented towards the principle of 'achieving the purpose': if the act, despite being flawed in form, has nevertheless achieved its objective (i.e., informing the accused of its content and implications), and the accused has been able to fully exercise their right to defense, the nullity loses its invalidating effect.
Judgment No. 24976 of 2025 by the Court of Cassation offers important food for thought for the accused and their defense counsel. On the one hand, it confirms the need for scrupulous attention to the formalities of notifications. On the other hand, however, it highlights that a mere formal irregularity is not sufficient to invalidate an act if the accused has demonstrated full knowledge of it and has exercised their right to defense. For legal professionals, this underscores the importance of constant vigilance and timely objection to any procedural defects, but also the awareness that active participation in the proceedings can be interpreted as tacit remediation. The protection of the right to defense, ultimately, is not just a matter of scrupulous adherence to forms, but also of the accused's actual ability to assert their arguments at every stage of the proceedings.