Judgment no. 37589 of August 2, 2018, by the Court of Cassation represents an important reference point for understanding the offenses of extortion and undue inducement. In this commentary, we will analyze the main legal issues addressed in the ruling and their relevance in the landscape of Italian criminal law.
The case concerns M. G., a public official accused of extortion for having requested a sum of money from the owner of a public establishment in exchange for not issuing a contravention. The Court of Appeal of Rome initially upheld the conviction, but the Court of Cassation held that the act should be classified as an attempt at undue inducement, rather than extortion.
The threat of an unjust harm by a public official aimed at obtaining money or other utility constitutes the crime of extortion only if the intimidation has an intensity such as to heavily impact the freedom of self-determination.
The Court clarified that extortion, under Article 317 of the Criminal Code, requires coercive pressure, while undue inducement, provided for by Article 319-quater of the Criminal Code, is configured as persuasion or deception. This distinction is fundamental for understanding the seriousness of the conduct and the related criminal consequences.
The decision of the Court of Cassation underscores the importance of legal classification in criminal law. The reclassification from extortion to attempted undue inducement has significant implications, both for determining the penalty and for recognizing the rights of the injured party. The Court also specified that the request for money cannot be considered valid if the victim acted to report the abuse.
Judgment no. 37589 of 2018 by the Court of Cassation offers important insights for reflections on criminal law and the protection of victims of abuse by public officials. The distinction between extortion and undue inducement is crucial for ensuring a fair legal framework for illicit conduct. The consequences of this judgment extend not only to the specific case but also to future judicial practice.