The nullity of a marriage celebrated in church can have a very different meaning before the ecclesiastical court and within the Italian legal system. If you have obtained a canonical judgment, or if the other person intends to request its civil recognition, it is natural to wonder whether your civil status will change, whether economic agreements remain valid, and what room you have to oppose it.
The ecclesiastical judgment alone does not produce civil effects. For a concordatary marriage, meaning one celebrated according to the Catholic rite and transcribed in the civil status registries, the exequatur of the Court of Appeal is required. I will explain what the Italian judge checks, why a long marital life can become relevant, and which financial protections must be distinguished from the divorce maintenance allowance.
Canonical nullity concerns the validity of consent at the time of the wedding. The ecclesiastical court may declare that the bond was not validly formed under canon law, for example because an essential condition of consent was lacking. Therefore, this is not a separation and not a divorce: the latter intervene on a marriage considered valid and regulate its crisis or the cessation of its civil effects.
For the Italian State, an autonomous proceeding is necessary. Article 8 of the Agreement revising the Concordat, made executive by Law No. 121 of 25 March 1985, provides that ecclesiastical judgments of nullity be declared effective in the Italian Republic by the competent Court of Appeal, upon the petition of both spouses or even just one. The current text of the Agreement can be consulted in Law No. 121 of 1985.
The exequatur concerns only marriage with civil effects. If the religious marriage was not transcribed, the issue of nullity may remain relevant solely within the canonical legal system, but there is no concordatary civil marriage to render ineffective. If, however, transcription took place, the ecclesiastical measure must pass the review of the Court of Appeal before impacting civil status.
The Italian judge does not repeat the canonical trial. The Court of Appeal does not decide anew whether, under Church law, the marriage was null. Rather, it checks whether the ecclesiastical decision, now enforceable in the canonical legal system, can enter the Italian legal system without violating essential guarantees.
Contradictory proceedings and the right of defense must have been respected. In concrete terms, each spouse must have had the effective opportunity to participate in the ecclesiastical trial and to assert their reasons. The Constitutional Court has clarified that the Court of Appeal must verify both the right to act and defend in court and the absence of provisions contrary to Italian public policy: this is a fundamental check, not an automatic formality. See Judgment No. 18 of 1982 of the Constitutional Court.
Public policy protects the unrenounceable principles of the Italian legal system. It does not coincide with a generic difference between canon law and civil law. It can become decisive, for example, if the cause of nullity depends on an internal intention of only one of the spouses that the other did not know and could not reasonably have known: in such cases, the reliance and good faith of the unaware person come into play.
A final canonical judgment and the acts certifying its enforceability are required. The civil petition cannot be based solely on the initiation of the ecclesiastical proceeding or on a decision that is not yet enforceable. Furthermore, it is required that the marriage was celebrated according to the Catholic rite and transcribed for civil effects, because this very connection justifies the special procedure provided by the Agreement.
The review does not allow correcting the merits of the ecclesiastical judgment. This does not mean, however, that the Court of Appeal must limit itself to taking note of the measure. The distinction is important: the Court does not substitute its own assessment for the canonical one, but must halt recognition when the required guarantees are lacking or when civil effects would conflict with fundamental Italian principles.
A long and stable marital cohabitation can be an obstacle to civil recognition. It is not enough to count the years elapsed since celebration. What matters is whether, after the wedding, the spouses built an effective common life, mutually assuming the duties and responsibilities of marriage: shared housing, organization of family life, mutual support, and a common project are facts that may become relevant.
The reference to three years must not be turned into an automatic rule. Case law has linked cohabitation as spouses lasting for at least three years to a public policy limit, but the assessment requires ascertaining how the relationship actually unfolded. Moreover, not every canonical cause raises the same issues: the type of flaw ascertained and its possible correspondence with causes of invalidity provided by civil law also assume relevance.
The procedural issue of cohabitation requires care. By interlocutory order No. 30993 of 26 November 2025, the First Civil Section of the Court of Cassation submitted to the First President, for possible assignment to the United Sections, the question of whether ultra-three-year cohabitation must be raised by the summoned spouse within defense deadlines or can be raised by the judge when it emerges from the files. For this reason, anyone intending to oppose should not trust that the Court will notice the cohabitation on its own: they must precisely set forth the facts and available evidence. The measure is available in the Cassation file on order No. 30993 of 2025.
The evidence concerns the quality of common life, not just residence. A registry certificate may be useful, but it does not prove a material and spiritual communion by itself. Conversely, a different residence does not necessarily exclude every marital relationship. Tax returns, housing contracts, expense management, communications, and testimonies can become relevant only if they help reconstruct specific facts.
The exequatur does not automatically cancel every economic protection. When a marriage is declared null, the rules of putative marriage can come into play. This expression indicates the null marriage which, due to the good faith of one or both spouses at the time of the wedding, retains certain protective effects up until the nullity judgment.
The civil code provides different protections depending on good or bad faith. Article 129 allows the judge, if both spouses were in good faith, to order periodic sums for a period not exceeding three years in favor of the party who lacks adequate income and has not remarried. Article 129-bis instead concerns the spouse to whom the nullity is attributable and provides for compensation in favor of the other spouse in good faith, in addition to alimony when the relative conditions are met. The provisions are contained in Articles 128, 129, and 129-bis of the civil code.
Good faith does not mean merely the absence of generic fault. It is necessary to understand what each spouse knew, or could have known, when they celebrated the marriage and regarding the cause of nullity. The canonical judgment can be an important element, but it does not automatically substitute the civil assessment necessary to request economic protection based on Articles 129 or 129-bis of the civil code.
Children remain protected from the nullity of the marriage. The civil code establishes that a marriage declared null produces the effects of a valid marriage with respect to children. Therefore, the exequatur neither transforms nor eliminates the parent-child relationship, nor does it abolish the duties of maintenance, care, and education. Decisions concerning minor children or adult children who are not financially self-sufficient require a separate and concrete assessment of their needs.
Exequatur must not be confused with an automatic revision of civil measures. An ecclesiastical judgment, before receiving exequatur, does not replace the separation, divorce, or economic orders issued by the Italian judge. Unilaterally interrupting payments ordered in civil proceedings by invoking solely the canonical decision exposes one to serious consequences and is not a prudent choice.
A divorce allowance already in dispute may remain the subject of the proceedings. The United Sections of the Court of Cassation, with Judgment No. 9004 of 31 March 2021, affirmed that subsequent exequatur does not terminate the proceedings concerning economic consequences when the head concerning divorce status is already final but the decision on the allowance is not yet final. In that situation, the trial continues to establish whether the allowance is due and to what extent. The principle is illustrated in the bulletin of the Court of Cassation on judgment No. 9004 of 2021.
The sequence of acts changes the concrete consequences. A petition for exequatur filed before divorce poses different problems than an exequatur intervened after a final civil judgment. It is necessary to distinguish personal status, any temporary measures, economic rulings still subject to appeal, and those already covered by res judicata. Using the word “nullity” as if it alone resolved all these levels risks causing the loss of rights already matured.
Joint petition and opposition serve different needs. If both spouses request recognition, the Court of Appeal must still verify the prerequisites provided by law. If the petition comes from only one party, the other can enter an appearance and contest relevant aspects, such as the respect of the right of defense, contrariety to public policy, the quality of cohabitation following the wedding, or economic claims.
It is advisable to separate documents immediately by function. The ecclesiastical judgment and the attestation of enforceability serve to substantiate the petition for exequatur; the acts of the canonical proceeding help verify defense guarantees; documents on common life are important for cohabitation; income, assets, essential expenses, and work data are useful if economic protections are in dispute. This distinction avoids treating documents that have different meanings as proof of the same thing.
The point to clarify is not only whether to request nullity. The civil effect of actual interest must be identified: obtaining recognition of the ecclesiastical decision, preventing it for reasons of public policy, protecting the continuity of a divorce allowance, requesting measures provided for putative marriage, or protecting children. These are pathways that may intertwine, but they do not coincide.
No, it does not apply automatically. Even a final ecclesiastical judgment must be declared effective by the Court of Appeal if it concerns a concordatary marriage transcribed in civil registries. The Court verifies defense guarantees, public policy, and the other prerequisites provided by the Agreement. Until exequatur, the ecclesiastical decision does not replace pre-existing civil measures.
Yes, cohabitation can be a relevant ground for opposition. However, you must indicate concrete facts showing an effective and stable marital life, not just the time elapsed since the wedding. Since the Cassation referred to the United Sections a question on how this obstacle operates in the trial, it is prudent not to leave the objection implicit or entrusted to unexplained documents.
No, not automatically. The Cassation has established that exequatur does not interrupt the trial on the allowance when the divorce status is already final and the economic part is still pending. If there is an economic measure that is already final, one must instead carefully read the res judicata and applicable civil tools: nullity alone does not authorize suspending payments.
Protection may exist, but it does not coincide with the divorce allowance. Articles 129 and 129-bis of the civil code provide remedies linked to the good faith of the spouses, the imputability of nullity, economic conditions, and, for the periodic sums of Article 129, also the maximum limit of three years. The petition must be linked to facts demonstrating those prerequisites.
No, nullity does not eliminate the status of children. The civil code preserves for them the effects of a valid marriage. Consequently, the duties of maintenance, care, education, and contribution to expenses remain autonomous. If decisions regarding custody, visitation times, or financial contributions are pending, they must be addressed according to the concrete best interest of the children and not as an automatic consequence of nullity.
The central sources are Article 8 of the Agreement implemented by Law No. 121 of 1985, Articles 128, 129, and 129-bis of the civil code, and the constitutional and legitimacy case law cited in the guide. Their connection explains why exequatur is not a bureaucratic step: the canonical decision and the civil effects belong to distinct legal systems, coordinated through specific controls.
Before making economic decisions, it is necessary to distinguish the canonical measure from the civil one. The question to ask is what effect has already arisen in the Italian State and what, instead, still requires a judgment by the Court of Appeal. The possibility of opposition, the relevance of cohabitation, the protection of reliance, and the type of economic protection potentially requestable depend on this distinction.