A charge of perjury can arise from a statement deemed untrue, silence on an important fact, or a contradiction with previous statements. I understand how difficult it can be to distinguish an incomplete memory from a conscious lie, especially when the hearing transcript reports questions and answers in summary form. Not every inconsistency is perjury: first, it is necessary to establish whether the statement was made as a witness before the judicial authority and whether it concerns a fact that the person genuinely knew about.
In this guide, I explain which elements constitute the crime, why intent matters, what it means to retract, and which choices should not be confused with one another. The objective is to help you read the allegation with greater precision, without jumping to conclusions simply because two versions of events do not match.
Article 372 of the Italian Criminal Code concerns anyone who testifies as a witness before the judicial authority and states something false, denies what is true, or conceals in whole or in part what they know about the facts subject to questioning. The prescribed penalty is imprisonment from two to six years. The text of the provision also includes depositions before the International Criminal Court; for the Italian legal system, the primary reference remains testimony given in proceedings before a judge. You can consult the text of Article 372 referenced in the Official Gazette.
The qualification as a witness is decisive. A statement made to the judicial police, the public prosecutor, or defense counsel during investigations does not automatically become perjury. A different offense, with its own prerequisites, may come into play, or there may be no such criminal allegation at all. For a proper defense, therefore, it is not enough to read the expression "false statement": one must identify who asked the questions, in which proceedings, at what time, and with what procedural role you were heard.
It is not required that the judge has decided incorrectly. The Constitutional Court has clarified that perjury is a crime of concrete danger: the statement or reticence must be concretely capable of misleading the judge and altering their conviction, even if it ultimately did not affect the final decision. This principle prevents both minimizing a potentially misleading deposition and equating any marginal detail to a crime. The reference is the judgment of the Constitutional Court no. 157 of 2025.
Stating something false means reporting as true a fact that does not correspond to reality. Denying the truth means excluding a fact that actually happened. Reticence consists of concealing, entirely or in part, what one knows about a circumstance subject to questioning. The three behaviors are not interchangeable: in reticence, in particular, the precise content of the question matters, as does proving that the witness knew the omitted information.
A contradiction alone does not prove a lie. Two reconstructions may diverge because a question was generic, because the event was perceived under difficult conditions, because memory faded, or because the words used have an ambiguous meaning. If, for example, a person states they do not remember the exact time of a meeting, the error does not automatically equate to the conscious denial of a certain fact. The case is different when a deposition securely excludes a presence that the witness knows instead took place.
The fact must be capable of affecting the judgment. Not all information that emerges at a hearing carries the same weight. A discrepancy on a collateral circumstance may remain extraneous to the capacity to mislead the judge; a response regarding who was present, what was seen, or a directly contested event may carry an entirely different significance. The comparison must be carried out on the specific fact, not on a generic impression of incoherence.
The transcript documents the deposition, but does not replace the context of the deposition. It is necessary to distinguish the actual formulation of the question from the answer given, any clarifications made, objections raised during the hearing, and other elements already acquired. A brief response may appear reticent only if a clarification given shortly before is ignored; conversely, an apparently cautious formula may conceal the omission of information requested in a clear manner.
Previous statements require a punctual comparison. It is not sufficient to observe that a version differs from one given months earlier. One must ask which of the two statements is objectively false, what knowledge the witness had at the time of the hearing, and whether the difference concerns an essential fact or the way it was remembered or described. This distinction is often the starting point for a serious challenge to the accusation.
Perjury requires conscious conduct. The prosecution must prove that the person stated what was false, denied the truth, or concealed a circumstance while knowing how matters stood. It is not necessary to prove a particular personal advantage or the intention to favor someone, but it is necessary to prove awareness of the untruth of what was declared or of the truth that was omitted.
Fear, confusion, and memory are not automatic formulas for defense. They can be relevant only if they find support in the concrete dynamics of the examination. An uncertain memory can explain a cautious answer; it does not justify a reconstruction presented as certain if available data shows that the witness knew the contrary. For this reason, it is important not to overlap the human difficulty of testifying with the legal level of proving intent.
Proof of the subjective element stems from the facts. The clarity of the questions, the witness's position relative to the event, their previous statements, documents, messages, images, or other objective data may assume relevance. No single element applies in the abstract to every case: a previous statement may be more imprecise than one given at the hearing, while a document may demonstrate only part of the fact. The defense must keep separate what the witness actually perceived, what they deduced, and what was reported to them by others.
Retraction does not coincide with a simple change of heart. Article 376 of the Italian Criminal Code provides a ground of non-punishability also for perjury when a witness who has deposed retracts the falsehood and manifests the truth within the proceedings in which the statements were made. The two parts must go together: it is not enough to say one made a mistake, nor is it enough to correct a detail without clarifying which part was untrue and what the true reconstruction is.
The deadline depends on the proceedings in which the deposition was made. If the falsehood occurred in criminal proceedings, the retraction must take place no later than the closing of the trial hearing (dibattimento). If it occurred in a civil suit, it must take place before the pronouncement of the final judgment, even if not yet irrevocable. The rules and deadlines result from the normative reference to Article 376 of the Italian Criminal Code.
A delayed retraction does not produce the effect provided by Article 376. This does not mean that any subsequent conduct is irrelevant in criminal proceedings, but special non-punishability requires compliance with the conditions established by law. It is therefore risky to treat retraction as a merely declarative choice or as a letter to be sent outside the proceedings: the relevant proceedings, the actual phase, and the complete content of the new statement must be evaluated.
The first alternative is to verify whether the crime is truly configurable. If the quality of witness before the judicial authority is missing, if a false or concealed fact is not identified, if the circumstance was not capable of influencing the judge's conviction, or if awareness of falsehood is missing, the accusation under Article 372 can be challenged in its essential elements. This path does not consist of generically denying the charge: it requires a reconstruction adherent to the transcripts and available evidence.
Retraction is a different path. It makes sense only when an untruthful statement was effectively made and temporal conditions still exist to manifest the truth in the same proceedings. It is not compatible with a defense line that argues, at the same time, the full truth of the contested deposition. Before taking any step, one must understand which reconstruction is sustainable and what legal effect may derive from it.
There are also procedural tools distinct from the ascertainment of innocence. Suspension of proceedings with probation (messa alla prova) is abstractly accessible also for perjury, as recognized by the Constitutional Court when recalling the link between Article 372 of the Italian Criminal Code and Article 550, paragraph 2, of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure. Access, however, depends on the requirements of the institution and the phase of the proceedings: it is not an automatic outcome and does not replace verification of the foundation of the accusation.
Acting without reconstructing the exact words can create new problems. If you receive a notice, a summons, or learn that files have been transmitted for perjury, it is useful to keep the citation received, available transcripts, and any documents placing the facts in time. It is not appropriate to contact involved persons to coordinate versions or solicit statements: besides failing to clarify the accusation, a similar initiative can have autonomous consequences.
The starting point is identifying the contested phrase. From there, one can distinguish a perception error from a consciously false statement, reticence from an unclear question, witness testimony from statements made with a different procedural role. If you need a consultation regarding proceedings in Milan, you can contact me to examine these elements with my staff.
No, changing versions is not sufficient. The prosecution must identify a false statement, a denial of the truth, or reticence given as a witness before the judicial authority. Furthermore, it must emerge that you knew the fact and that the conduct was concretely capable of misleading the judge. A difference explicable by memory, perception, or different questions must be distinguished from conscious falsehood.
Not automatically. Article 372 concerns witness depositions before the judicial authority. Statements made to the judicial police or the public prosecutor may be governed by different rules, with requirements and consequences that are not superimposable. Before qualifying the charge, one must ascertain the role with which you were heard and the act in which the statements were collected.
No, apologies do not replace retraction. Under Article 376, it is necessary to retract the falsehood and manifest the truth within the proceedings in which the statement was made. The new exposition must therefore clarify the untrue content and provide a reconstruction corresponding to the facts. Compliance with the deadline provided by law for the relevant criminal or civil trial also matters.
No, it produces non-punishability only under legal conditions. In criminal proceedings, it must intervene no later than the closing of the trial hearing; in a civil suit, it must precede the final judgment, even if not yet irrevocable. A correction made in another context or after the deadline does not automatically have the effect disciplined by Article 376.
The request is abstractly possible. Perjury is among the offenses for which suspension of proceedings with probation can operate, but admission requires the conditions provided by the institution and compliance with the useful procedural phase. It is not equivalent to an acquittal and does not render the evaluation of the reconstruction of contested facts irrelevant.