Ideological Forgery and Private Acts: The Boundaries of the Offense According to the Court of Cassation in Ruling No. 31112 of 2025

The Italian legal landscape is constantly enriched by jurisprudential pronouncements that define and redefine the boundaries of criminal offenses. The recent Ruling No. 31112, filed on September 16, 2025, by the Court of Cassation (Sixth Criminal Section), represents a fundamental clarification regarding ideological forgery committed by a public official, with particular reference to defense documents. The decision, which saw M. T. as the defendant and Dr. S. P. as the rapporteur, partially annulled without referral a previous ruling by the Court of Appeal of Rome, offering crucial insights into the nature of judicial documents and the moment at which they acquire 'public faith'.

The Context of the Ruling: When a Forgery is Not a Crime

The case examined by the Supreme Court concerned the conduct of a court clerk who had affixed the defense counsel's forged signature to some defense writings. The central issue was to determine whether such an action constituted the crime of ideological forgery committed by a public official in public documents, as provided for by Articles 476 and 479 of the Criminal Code. These articles punish, respectively, material and ideological forgery committed by a public official in a public document, i.e., a document drawn up with specific formalities by a public official or in the exercise of a public function, which attests to facts that occurred in his presence or were carried out by him.

The Court of Cassation, presided over by Dr. D. A. G., analyzed the timing of the forged signature: it had been affixed 'before the filing' of the documents. And this is precisely the focal point of the ruling. The court of last resort highlighted how the nature of the document, and consequently its suitability to constitute a forgery offense, depends on the moment it is drawn up and acquires its 'public faith'.

The Crucial Distinction: Private Act vs. Public Act

To fully understand the scope of the ruling, it is essential to recall the distinction between a private act and a public act. Article 2699 of the Civil Code defines a public act as a document drawn up, with the required formalities, by a notary or other public official authorized to give it public faith in the place where the act is drawn up. In the procedural context, defense documents, such as pleadings or motions, are considered private acts until they are filed with the competent court clerk's office. Only upon filing do they become part of the case file and acquire public significance, enjoying 'public faith' attesting to their veracity.

The Court of Cassation clarified that, before their filing, defense writings, although intended to be included in a public proceeding, retain their nature as private acts. This means that a forgery committed on such documents, before they acquire their official status through filing, cannot be attributed to the offense of forgery in a public document. This interpretation aligns with previous orientations of the United Sections of the Court of Cassation (such as No. 10929 of 1981 and No. 544 of 1984), which have always emphasized that the criminal relevance of forgery depends on the act's capacity to attest to facts with privileged faith.

The conduct of a court clerk who affixes the defense counsel's forged signature to defense writings before filing does not constitute the crime of ideological forgery committed by a public official in public documents, as per Articles 476 and 479 of the Criminal Code, as these are private acts. Forgery in a public document can only be relevant in relation to these acts after their filing.

The above summary encapsulates the core principle of the decision. The Court strongly emphasizes that the distinguishing element is the nature of the document at the time of the forgery. If the document is still private, even if intended to become public, the forgery cannot constitute the crime of ideological forgery by a public official in a public document. The legislator intended to protect public faith, i.e., the trust that the community places in acts originating from public administration or public officials. This trust is consolidated only when the act acquires official status. Before that moment, the conduct, even if illicit or ethically incorrect, does not take on the characteristics of the crime of forgery in a public document.

Practical Implications and Protection of Public Faith

This ruling has significant practical implications. Firstly, it provides clear guidance for legal professionals, precisely delimiting the scope of application of Articles 476 and 479 of the Criminal Code. The conduct of the court clerk, while not constituting the specific crime of forgery in a public document in this context, could still have other legal or disciplinary implications, depending on the specific circumstances and any other offenses committed (e.g., impersonation or fraud, if aimed at an illicit advantage). The ruling does not absolve the conduct itself but correctly frames it in terms of criminal legal qualification.

Jurisprudence has always sought to balance the need to protect public faith with the principle of the specificity of criminal offenses. The decision in question follows this line, reiterating that criminal protection of public faith is triggered when the document acquires its official status and privileged evidentiary capacity. It is a call for a strict interpretation of criminal laws, avoiding analogical extensions in malam partem (to the detriment of the defendant).

• **Clarity on Boundaries:** The ruling defines the exact moment when a document acquires 'public faith' for criminal purposes.
• **Protection of Legal Certainty:** It contributes to greater predictability of the legal consequences of conduct.
• **Relevance of Filing:** It emphasizes the importance of formal filing as the moment of transition from private to public act.

Conclusions: An Essential Clarification for Criminal Law

Ruling No. 31112 of 2025 by the Court of Cassation represents an important bulwark in the correct interpretation of offenses against public faith. It reiterates that ideological forgery committed by a public official in public documents cannot be established if the conduct refers to documents that, at the time of the forgery, still retain their nature as private acts, not having yet been formally filed. This principle not only protects individual citizens from possible extensive applications of criminal law but also ensures that public faith, the protected legal interest, is safeguarded in a manner consistent with the definitions and purposes of current norms. It is a firm point for lawyers, magistrates, and legal professionals, who will increasingly need to pay attention to the nature and moment of creation of documents for a correct legal qualification of conduct.