Suspension of National Proceedings for Preliminary Reference: The Keys to Cassation's Order 11815/2025

The dialogue between national courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is essential for the uniform application of European law. This complex interaction finds significant clarification in Order No. 11815 of May 5, 2025, of the Court of Cassation, presided over by R. G. A. F. and with R. R. as rapporteur. The ruling offers valuable insights into the powers of the national judge when a preliminary question is already pending before the CJEU, outlining a path of efficiency and consistency for the judicial system.

Dialogue Between Courts: The Preliminary Reference

The preliminary reference mechanism (Article 267 TFEU) allows national judges to ask the CJEU for an authentic interpretation of Union law or to assess its validity. This tool prevents divergent interpretations and ensures the uniform application of EU law. Order 11815/2025 addresses the management of situations where the same question has already been submitted to the CJEU by another judge and reappears before a different national judge.

Cassation's Order 11815/2025: A Firm Stance on Suspension

The Supreme Court's Order resolves significant procedural doubts. The headnote, which we reproduce in full, represents the core of the decision:

In matters of preliminary reference, the national judge, not of last instance, before whom a dispute is brought whose decision depends on a question previously submitted for examination by the CJEU, may legitimately suspend proceedings pending the ruling of the Court of Luxembourg, without the need to raise the same question before the EU judiciary, and with the possibility of appealing the suspension order, even if issued by a Justice of the Peace, through the necessary regulation of jurisdiction.

This ruling is crucial. The Cassation clarifies that a national judge, not of last instance, can suspend proceedings if the decision depends on a question of European law already under examination by the CJEU. The Court emphasizes a principle of procedural economy and legal consistency: it is not necessary for the national judge to raise the same question again, thus avoiding an overload for the CJEU and preventing conflicting rulings. This promotes a more efficient and harmonized application of Union law.

Furthermore, the D. v. V. judgment reiterates a fundamental aspect of procedural guarantees: the suspension order, even if issued by a Justice of the Peace, can be appealed through the necessary regulation of jurisdiction. This protects the right to challenge the decision, ensuring judicial review of the correct application of procedural principles. Article 295 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which governs the necessary suspension of proceedings, finds a specific and illuminating application here within the context of Union law, strengthening its function of coordination between legal systems.

Practical Implications and Procedural Safeguards

The practical consequences of this order are significant for lawyers and legal professionals. The possibility of suspending proceedings pending a CJEU ruling, without having to initiate a new preliminary reference, introduces greater predictability and rationality into litigation involving European law. Here are some key points:

• Procedural Efficiency: Duplication of preliminary references is avoided, lightening the CJEU's workload and reducing overall resolution times.
• Legal Consistency: Suspension ensures that the final decision conforms to the CJEU's interpretation, strengthening the uniformity of Union law.
• Legal Strategy: For lawyers, it becomes crucial to monitor preliminary questions already pending before the CJEU that could affect their cases, in order to request or oppose a suspension.
• Guarantee of Appeal: The confirmation of the possibility of recourse to the regulation of jurisdiction protects the parties' right of defense, even for decisions issued by lower courts.

Conclusions: Towards More Coherent European Justice

Cassation's Order 11815/2025 is an important piece in the construction of a more cohesive and efficient European judicial system. It not only provides clarity on a delicate procedural aspect but also strengthens the role of the national judge as a fundamental actor in the application of Union law. The ability to balance the autonomy of the domestic judge with the need for a uniform interpretation of European law is essential for the protection of citizens' rights and for legal certainty. This ruling is a striking example of how national jurisprudence actively contributes to refining the dialogue between courts, benefiting all legal professionals and, ultimately, justice itself.