In the realm of criminal law, particularly in bankruptcy proceedings, a cornerstone principle is the correlation between the charge brought and the verdict rendered. This principle, enshrined in Article 521 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, aims to safeguard the defendant's right to a defense, ensuring they are only called to answer for the facts they have been accused of. But what happens when, during the proceedings, the originally alleged fact undergoes modifications, perhaps in its legal qualification or the defendant's role? The Court of Cassation, with its recent ruling no. 25506 of March 26, 2025 (filed on July 10, 2025), has provided a fundamental clarification regarding bankruptcy offenses, outlining the boundaries within which such modifications are permissible without infringing upon fundamental defense rights.
Article 521 c.p.p. states that the judge cannot issue a verdict on a new fact or a different legal qualification of a fact without first informing the defendant and granting them sufficient time to prepare a new defense. The objective is clear: to prevent "surprise verdicts" that could prejudice the defendant's ability to defend themselves adequately. This principle is a pillar of a fair trial, also guaranteed by Article 111, paragraph 2, of the Italian Constitution and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
However, jurisprudence has long clarified that not every modification constitutes a violation. The crucial distinction lies in understanding whether the modification entails an "essential transformation of the charged fact." If the historical fact, in its essence, remains the same, and the modifications pertain only to the legal qualification or the title of participation in the offense, the correlation may not be violated, provided that defense rights have been preserved.
The procedural case that led to Cassation ruling no. 25506/2025 involved the defendant, Mr. C. L. P., initially accused of fraudulent bankruptcy by misappropriation. The charge was based on his role as a de facto administrator of a bankrupt company, thus presupposing a direct and conscious action aimed at diverting assets from the company's estate to the detriment of creditors. Fraudulent bankruptcy by misappropriation, as provided for by Article 216 of the Bankruptcy Law (Royal Decree no. 267/1942), is one of the most serious bankruptcy offenses, punishing those who misappropriate, conceal, hide, destroy, or dissipate the assets of the bankrupt.
During the proceedings, however, the legal qualification and the defendant's role were modified. The final conviction, issued by the Court of Appeal of Milan and subsequently upheld by the Cassation Court, was for external complicity in preferential bankruptcy. Preferential bankruptcy, governed by Article 216, paragraph 3, of the Bankruptcy Law, occurs when an entrepreneur, before or during the declaration of bankruptcy, makes payments or grants guarantees to certain creditors to the detriment of others, thereby altering the par condicio creditorum. "External complicity" implies that the defendant, while not formally holding the status of administrator or a bankrupt subject, contributed through their conduct to the commission of the offense by an insider.
The defense of C. L. P. evidently raised the issue of violation of Article 521 c.p.p., arguing that the shift from a charge of fraudulent bankruptcy by misappropriation as a de facto administrator to a conviction for external complicity in preferential bankruptcy constituted an essential transformation of the charged fact, prejudicing the right to defense. The Supreme Court, however, declared the appeal inadmissible, providing a clear interpretation.
The conviction of the defendant as an external accomplice in preferential bankruptcy, rather than as a de facto administrator in the originally charged offense of fraudulent patrimonial bankruptcy by misappropriation, does not violate the principle of correlation between charge and verdict, as such modification, not entailing an essential transformation of the charged fact, does not infringe upon defense rights.
This maxim is of utmost importance. The Cassation Court held that, despite the change in the offense title (from fraudulent to preferential) and the role (from de facto administrator to external accomplice), the factual core of the charge – namely, the conduct detrimental to the bankrupt estate and creditors – remained substantially unchanged. In other words, Mr. C. L. P.'s conduct, although reclassified, had been subject to accusation from the outset, allowing the defense to formulate its arguments. The Court thus reiterated that the principle of correlation is not violated when the modification:
This stance aligns with established jurisprudence (referencing precedents such as Rv. 279106-01 of 2020 or the United Sections Rv. 264438-01 of 2015), which tends to prioritize the substance of the facts over their mere legal label, provided that the defendant's full knowledge of the charge is always guaranteed.
Ruling no. 25506/2025 by the Court of Cassation reaffirms a fundamental concept in criminal procedural law: the flexibility in applying norms must never translate into an infringement of the defendant's fundamental rights. In this case, the reclassification of the bankruptcy offense and the defendant's role did not constitute a violation of the principle of correlation, as the "fact" in its historical-naturalistic dimension remained identical, and the defense had the opportunity to confront it. This approach ensures the effectiveness of criminal proceedings, allowing the judge to adapt the legal qualification to the procedural reality that emerged, without, however, compromising the defendant's inalienable right to a full and informed defense. For those operating in the field of bankruptcy and criminal law, this ruling constitutes a further piece in understanding the delicate balance between procedural requirements and individual guarantees.