In the complex landscape of criminal justice, the presumption of innocence represents an indispensable pillar, not only as a procedural guarantee but also as a bulwark protecting the dignity and reputation of the individual. But what happens when, despite an acquittal, the judicial decision itself seems to undermine this presumption, implying "substantial" guilt? The Court of Cassation, with its recent Judgment no. 18658 of 2025, has provided a clear and incisive answer, reaffirming the importance of judicial language that is faithful to constitutional and European principles. This ruling is not a mere technicality, but a fundamental warning for the protection of every citizen's rights.
The case that led to the Supreme Court's ruling, involving the defendant M. P. A. C., raised a question of crucial importance: the right of an acquitted defendant not to be indicated as guilty in the same judgment that declares them innocent. The Court of Appeal of Milan had issued a decision that, while concluding with an acquittal, used expressions that implied de facto responsibility. A practice that, unfortunately, is not so uncommon and can have devastating effects on the lives of those who, despite being acquitted, see their reputation compromised by ambiguous language.
The Court of Cassation, with the judgment presided over by Dr. A. P. and reported by Dr. S. R., declared the appeal inadmissible but took the opportunity to clarify a fundamental principle, summarized in the following maxim:
The right to the presumption of innocence, recognized by constitutional and conventional jurisprudence, is to be understood as the right of the acquitted and discharged person not to be indicated as guilty in the acquittal decision, and is protectable by ordinary means of appeal if it is violated through the use, in the aforementioned ruling, of judicial language that expresses assessments of "substantial" guilt.
This maxim is of extraordinary relevance. It emphasizes that the presumption of innocence is not exhausted by a formal acquittal but extends to the necessity that the reasoning of the judgment itself does not contain assessments that, while not leading to a conviction, suggest "substantial" guilt. Such language is not merely a stylistic nuance but a genuine violation of a fundamental right, protectable through ordinary means of appeal. This means that a discharged defendant, who finds themselves saddled with a sort of "acquittal with reservation" due to the reasoning, has the right to challenge such a formulation.
The Supreme Court's decision is rooted in a solid regulatory and jurisprudential framework, both national and supranational. Among the cited references, the following stand out:
These references demonstrate how the right to the presumption of innocence is not an isolated concept but part of a system of interconnected guarantees aimed at protecting the individual against the power of the State. The judgment of the Court of Cassation no. 18658/2025 fits perfectly into this framework, strengthening protection against "moral convictions" conveyed by improper judicial language.
The ruling of the Court of Cassation is an important reminder for all legal professionals. It reminds us that justice is not only the outcome of a trial but also the way in which that outcome is communicated. The choice of words, especially in a judicial context, carries specific weight and can profoundly affect people's lives. For a discharged defendant, acquittal must mean the full restoration of their dignity and reputation, without shadows or ambiguities. This principle not only protects the individual but also strengthens citizens' trust in the impartiality and fairness of the judicial system. Lawyers have the crucial task of ensuring that this right is always respected, guaranteeing that acquittal judgments are truly so, not only in form but also in the substance of the language used.