The ruling of the First Criminal Section no. 13512, filed on April 7, 2025, represents a further piece in the interpretative mosaic of art. 368 of the Italian Criminal Code. Once again, the Supreme Court reiterates that the protection of individual honorability and the proper functioning of justice do not tolerate gray areas: slander can be constituted even when the authority already knows about the criminal act, provided that no charges have been formally filed nor a trial has been opened. Let's see why the Court rejected the appeal filed by K. P. M. P. S. and what practical implications derive from the decision.
The case originates from statements made by the defendant against a person already subjected to a precautionary measure. These statements, although relating to a known fact, were deemed false by the investigators. In the absence of a formal charge of a crime, the Public Prosecutor's Office had nevertheless initiated preliminary investigations. The Court of Assizes of Appeal of Florence, with a judgment of June 5, 2024, confirmed the conviction for slander. The appellant invoked the non-existence of the objective element, arguing that the notification of the crime was already on file and that this excluded the possibility of 'accusing' the victim again.
The crime of slander is constituted even in the case where the false accusation concerns a crime already brought to the attention of the authority, provided that the charge has not yet been filed and the trial has not been initiated. (Case concerning a statement containing slanderous accusations against a person subjected to a precautionary measure not yet subject to judicial review).
The Court clarifies that what matters is not the novelty of the notification of the crime, but the effect of a false accusation formally made against an innocent person. As long as the judicial authority has not exercised criminal action, the accusation still 'hangs in the balance' between the investigation and the possible referral to trial. P. S. therefore engaged in conduct capable of initiating (or strengthening) an unjust proceeding, integrating the offense to the administration of justice that art. 368 of the Italian Criminal Code aims to prevent.
In light of these principles, professionals and citizens must exercise the utmost care in drafting complaints or statements pursuant to art. 351 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure. The instrumental use of criminal proceedings risks backfiring.
The ruling fits into a consolidated line of case law: Cass. no. 29579/2011, no. 14761/2018, and no. 20064/2024 had already affirmed the same stance, while the United Sections (no. 8544/2020; no. 33583/2015) provided the systematic framework, linking slander to the need to preserve the due process under art. 111 of the Italian Constitution. From a European Union perspective, art. 6 of the ECHR requires States to prevent unfair trials and, therefore, also mendacious complaints that trigger them.
Cass. no. 13512/2025 reiterates that the time window between investigation and imputation is fertile ground for slander. The lesson is twofold: on the one hand, the judicial authority obtains a clear parameter for distinguishing legitimate complaints from instrumental ones; on the other hand, those who intend to report a crime must do so scrupulously, aware that unfounded statements can lead to criminal liability. For legal professionals, the ruling represents a useful vademecum for assessing the existence of the crime of slander in the preliminary stages of proceedings.