Living apart does not mean being legally separated. When cohabitation ends, it is understandable to think that financial matters have also resolved themselves: one person changes residence, payments continue informally, and assets remain registered as before. Marriage, however, continues to produce effects that physical distance alone does not eliminate. Questions regarding the home, purchases, financial contributions, and claims arising during the relationship may remain open.
In this guide, I want to help you distinguish de facto separation from personal separation and understand why this difference affects your assets and the timeframe for enforcing certain rights. We will also examine a delicate point: marriage can suspend the limitation period, but a stable crisis should not be managed by relying on a rule read in an automatic way.
De facto separation is a factual situation, not a legal status. It exists when spouses stop living together or sharing a common life without obtaining a judicial separation and without concluding a separation agreement in the forms provided by law. It may arise from a shared choice or the initiative of only one spouse, but it does not alter civil status on its own or dissolve the matrimonial bond.
Duties and relationships born from marriage do not disappear automatically. The Civil Code regulates both the mutual duties of spouses and personal separation as a distinct institution. The cessation of cohabitation may make certain aspects of family life impracticable, but it does not establish who must bear specific expenses, who may use the home, or which assets remain common. The relevant rules are gathered in the Civil Code in force as of June 14, 2026, particularly in Articles 143 and following, 150 and following, 177 and following, and 2941 and following.
A private understanding can regulate daily life, but it does not replace personal separation. Spouses can decide who temporarily remains in the home, who pays the utilities, or how to handle a child's expense. These decisions can be useful, especially if they are clear and documented. However, they do not produce, on their own, the effects that the law attaches to formalised separation: they do not dissolve the legal community of property and do not set an allowance determined by a judge.
Leaving the home must also be read in its context. Not every departure from the family home has the same meaning. What counts are the reasons for the choice, any agreement between the spouses, the presence of children, and the way expenses are managed. Changing residence may be an important element in reconstructing a crisis, but it does not equate on its own to a decision on the personal and financial consequences of separation.
The end of cohabitation does not automatically create a maintenance allowance. Article 156 of the Civil Code concerns the allowance that a judge may grant in personal separation, under the conditions indicated by the rule. During a de facto separation, one spouse may receive money from the other, but a periodic transfer does not thereby become a judicial allowance with a predefined amount, deadline, and legal basis.
The purpose of payments matters. A sum paid each month may be a contribution to family expenses, temporary help, the repayment of a debt, or an advance on other agreements. If a formalised agreement is lacking, the meaning of the payment depends on the facts: messages, payment descriptions, expenses actually incurred, financial resources, and the conduct maintained by both. Leaving everything undefined can make it more difficult to reconstruct what was agreed upon.
Staying in the home does not automatically grant ownership. The use of the home, property ownership, the lease agreement, the mortgage, and condominium expenses are different relationships. A spouse can continue to live in the family home without becoming its owner; likewise, the owner is not thereby freed from every obligation connected to the home or the children. Personal separation can regulate the use of the dwelling, but it does not transfer the asset itself.
Children do not have to wait for the formalisation of the crisis to be protected. Both parents remain required to contribute to maintenance, care, instruction, and education in proportion to their respective resources. When a de facto agreement does not guarantee continuity or one of the parents does not contribute adequately, the problem is not only financial: verifiable rules must be established for the children's needs and the division of responsibilities.
De facto separation does not dissolve the legal community of property. If the spouses have not chosen the regime of separation of property through a matrimonial convention, the ordinary regime is the legal community of property. Purchases made during marriage can therefore continue to pose problems even when the couple no longer lives together. The moment cohabitation ceased is not, by itself, a cause for dissolution provided by law.
A purchase registered to a single spouse is not always exclusively their asset. To understand whether an asset enters the community, one must consider the property regime, the date of purchase, and the hypotheses of personal property provided by Article 179 of the Civil Code. The origin of the money, the content of the deed, and the nature of the asset may be relevant. Formal registration and de facto separation are important facts, but they do not resolve the issue on their own.
The dissolution of the community and the division are two different steps. Article 191 of the Civil Code identifies the causes that terminate the community for the future. In judicial separation, the measure authorising the spouses to live apart is relevant; in consensual separation before the court, the signing of the report is relevant, provided it is subsequently homologated. The regulations also take into account agreements reached through assisted negotiation and agreements before the civil status officer. The text of Law no. 55 of 2015 clarifies the time references connected to separation and divorce.
After dissolution, assets are not distributed automatically. Division requires identifying what falls within the common estate, which assets are personal, which sums must be balanced, and which debts burden each party. Bank accounts, real estate, savings, and financing may follow different rules. Confusing the dissolution of the regime with actual division can leave the most significant financial issues unresolved.
Debts require the same attention as purchases. A spouse who signs a mortgage, a guarantee, or a loan does not become free simply because cohabitation ceases. On the other side, the other spouse is not automatically responsible for every debt incurred after departure. It is necessary to distinguish personal obligations, expenses incurred for family needs, guarantees provided, and any connection to common assets.
Formalising separation serves to regulate what the de facto situation leaves open. A consensual separation allows spouses to agree on personal and financial conditions in compliance with the law; if there is no agreement, judicial separation allows the judge to adopt the necessary measures. In both cases, the marital crisis assumes a legal relevance that physical distance alone does not produce.
Assisted negotiation is a consensual alternative to court proceedings. When conditions are met, spouses can reach a separation agreement with the assistance of lawyers; the agreement follows the verifications required by law and produces the effects established by the applicable rules. It is not a simple exchange of private declarations. It can be a useful path if the understanding also concerns financial contributions, children, or the timing of the separation, and the parties manage to define compatible conditions.
Divorce does not run from the date one leaves the home. Law no. 55 of 2015 links the period necessary to file for divorce to a formalised personal separation: six months in consensual cases indicated by the law and twelve months in judicial separation. For agreements concluded through assisted negotiation or before the civil status officer, the regulations identify specific starting dates. Calculating these times from a change of address or a merely verbal understanding exposes one to errors.
Separation and divorce remain distinct. Personal separation regulates the cessation of common life and its effects; it does not yet dissolve the marriage. Divorce requires a subsequent step. This distinction also affects financial choices: a common asset, a debt, or a claim does not become irrelevant because the couple has already organised two separate lives.
Before discussing the limitation period, the right must be identified. A reimbursement for expenses incurred, a sum given as a loan, a claim arising from the management of a property, or a request connected to the division of assets do not necessarily follow the same limitation period. It is necessary to understand what the claim is, when it became due, and what documents prove its existence. Saying generically that it is money given to the spouse is not enough to calculate the useful time.
Suspension blocks time, but does not erase the problem. Article 2941 of the Civil Code provides for the suspension of the limitation period in the relationships indicated by the rule, including that between spouses. Suspending means that the time already elapsed remains acquired and its course stops as long as the cause of suspension operates; it does not mean that the claim is ascertained, nor that its term becomes unlimited. The interruption of the limitation period is a different mechanism and requires an act suitable for the right to be protected.
Legal separation changes the picture. The Constitutional Court, in judgment no. 7 of 2026, recalls the orientation according to which the suspension of the limitation period no longer operates between legally separated spouses, because the reason for protecting the affective relationship and the communion of life ceases to exist. The ruling directly concerns the extension of suspension to de facto cohabitants, but explains the substantive value attributed to the actual bond. The text is available in the judgment of the Constitutional Court no. 7 of 2026.
De facto separation alone does not allow for a secure automatic calculation. The constitutional decision does not resolve a case of spouses who are only de facto separated and does not indicate a standard date from which suspension ceases in every unformalised crisis. For this reason, it would be risky to conclude, without more, that the still-existing marriage certainly suspends any term or, conversely, that the limitation period began running on the day of departure. The claim, the duration of the crisis, and the evidence of the cessation of common life can become decisive.
Proof of facts can affect things just as much as the date of an act. Change of residence, expense agreements, communications showing a definitive breakdown, opening of negotiations, or judicial initiatives can help reconstruct the relationship. However, no isolated element replaces the identification of the right and the applicable term. If a claim is close to a potential limitation period, waiting for a future definition of the separation can turn uncertainty into a difficult dispute to resolve.
The first distinction concerns the stability of the choice to live apart. If distance is a temporary period and the spouses intend to resume cohabitation, it may be reasonable to maintain provisional practical management. If, on the other hand, the breakdown is stable, it is advisable not to leave concrete questions unanswered: who pays for what, which asset is common, how children are managed, and whether there are claims to be enforced.
A written agreement is useful only if it describes its subject matter with precision. For a monthly contribution, it is important to indicate the amount, purpose, period, and method of payment. For real estate, a share, a mortgage, or the transfer of a property right, the forms and acts required to produce the intended effect are needed instead. A generic formula may reduce conflict in the immediate term, but it does not always resolve the problem that will emerge later.
Documentation serves to distinguish different facts. Bank statements, bank transfers with reasons, contracts, purchase deeds, receipts, and relevant communications can clarify whether a sum was a loan, a family expense, or a due payment. Every expense does not need to be turned into a dispute; however, it is prudent not to entrust uncertain memories with matters concerning assets, debts, or claims accrued over years of shared life.
The solution must correspond to the problem to be solved. If rules on children, housing, contributions, and future assets are needed, personal separation offers tools that de facto separation does not create. If the crux is an already arisen claim, the applicable term and any necessary initiative to preserve it must be identified instead. To orient these choices on concrete facts, you can contact me.
No, changing residence is not enough. De facto separation describes a living condition, whereas personal separation requires a formalised path. As long as it is lacking, the marriage continues to exist and the effects relating to the dissolution of the community, the allowance established by the judge, and the running of the period required for divorce do not occur automatically.
You can receive contributions, but that does not mean a judicial allowance exists. Spouses can spontaneously organise payments during de facto separation. The allowance provided by Article 156 of the Civil Code, however, is linked to personal separation and the conditions indicated by the rule. The description of payments remains important to avoid misunderstandings regarding their legal title.
Not necessarily. If the legal community of property is still in force, living separately does not dissolve it. To establish whether the asset is common or personal, one must look at the date, the type of purchase, the origin of the money, and the exceptions provided by the Civil Code. Registration in the name of a single spouse does not always close the issue.
No, it does not run from the day cohabitation ends. The law links the six months or twelve months to the moments provided after a formalised personal separation, with specific rules for the various consensual procedures. It is therefore incorrect to calculate the term from the transfer of residence, the delivery of keys, or a merely verbal agreement.
Waiting can expose you to a dispute over the limitation period. First, it must be understood whether a claim exists, when it became due, and what limitation period applies to it. Suspension between spouses is an important rule, but it should not be turned into an automatic guarantee when common life has ceased and the situation remains merely de facto.