Freedom of Political Criticism and Defamation: An Analysis of Ruling No. 27853 of 2025

In the Italian legal landscape, the delicate balance between freedom of expression and the protection of reputation is a constant subject of debate and jurisprudential intervention. The Court of Cassation, with its recent ruling no. 27853 of 02/07/2025 (filed on 29/07/2025), presided over by Dr. P. R. and with Dr. G. R. as rapporteur, has provided an important interpretation regarding defamation through the press, with particular reference to political criticism and informational pluralism. This decision, which quashed without referral a judgment by the Court of Appeal of Milan, serves as a beacon for understanding the limits and conditions for exercising the right to criticism.

The Right to Political Criticism: A Democratic Pillar

The right to political criticism represents one of the highest manifestations of freedom of expression, a cornerstone principle of any modern democracy. In Italy, it finds its protection in Article 21 of the Constitution, which enshrines the right to freely express one's thoughts through any medium. At the European level, Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) further strengthens this guarantee, recognizing that freedom of expression includes not only information and ideas that are considered inoffensive or indifferent but also those that offend, shock, or disturb the State or any sector of the population.

However, this freedom is not unlimited. It must be balanced with other fundamental rights, such as the right to reputation and honor, protected by Article 595 of the Criminal Code concerning defamation. Jurisprudence is therefore called upon to define the boundary between the legitimate exercise of the right to criticism – which, pursuant to Article 51 of the Criminal Code, constitutes a justification (or "exemption") – and defamatory conduct. It is in this context that ruling no. 27853 of 2025 authoritatively intervenes.

In matters of defamation, when the news concerns the influence of political forces or other factors on the media, for the purpose of judging the applicability of the exemption for exercising the right to criticism, consideration must be given to the essential need of a democratic state to ensure public debate on informational pluralism, provided that the expressions used do not translate into an aggressive attack on the offended party, devoid of any justification within the broader political criticism intended to be conveyed to citizens. (In this case, the Court affirmed the existence of the exemption regarding expressions contained in an article, published in an "online" newspaper, concerning the "carving up" of appointments for top RAI positions, observing that the average reader, from a comprehensive reading of the text, could have understood the nature of political criticism even in the statements contested as defamatory).

This maxim encapsulates the fundamental principle expressed by the Court. When criticism concerns the influence of politics on the media – a topic of crucial importance for democratic health – the judgment on defamation must consider the need to promote public debate on informational pluralism. This means that statements, even harsh ones, can be legitimate if they fall within a broader context of political criticism and aim to convey a message to citizens, without degenerating into an "aggressive attack" on the person, devoid of any justification. The Court emphasizes the importance of analyzing the overall context and the impact on the "average reader" to discern the nature of the criticism.

Limits of Criticism: When Defamation Prevails

Although the right to criticism is broad, the Cassation reiterates that it encounters insurmountable limits. It is not permissible, in fact, for criticism to transform into a gratuitous and unjustified aggression against the dignity of others. Ruling no. 27853 of 2025, while expanding the scope of political criticism, confirms that the absence of "any justification" renders an attack defamatory. This implies that the expression must maintain a connection with the fact being criticized and must not transcend into personal invective or merely denigrating attacks.

To assess whether criticism is legitimate or not, established jurisprudence requires the presence of certain conditions:

• Formal restraint: the expressions used must be proportionate and must not devolve into unnecessarily offensive or vulgar language, even if the criticism can be sharp.
• Relevance: the criticism must be relevant to the public interest and pertinent to the political or social issue being debated.
• Truthfulness (for reporting, less stringent for criticism): although objective truth of facts is not required for political criticism as it is for the right to report news, it is necessary for the critic to start from a factual basis, even if interpreted subjectively, and not from completely unfounded or pretextual statements. The ruling emphasizes that criticism must not be "devoid of any justification."

In the specific case addressed by ruling no. 27853 of 2025, the Court assessed the expressions contained in an article published in an online newspaper, concerning the "carving up" of appointments for top RAI positions. The defendant, L. T., was acquitted because her statements, although strong, were interpreted within the context of broader political criticism. The Cassation held that the average reader could grasp the political nature of these statements, understanding their function in stimulating debate on informational pluralism, and not as mere personal attacks.

Conclusions

Ruling no. 27853 of 2025 by the Court of Cassation represents a fundamental reference point for understanding the limits and opportunities of the right to political criticism in the context of defamation through the press. By reiterating the importance of debate on informational pluralism in a democracy, the Court has clarified that expressions, even if incisive, fall under the exemption of exercising the right to criticism if they do not degenerate into an aggressive and unjustified attack on the offended party. This decision offers important insights for legal professionals and for all those involved in information and communication, outlining a subtle but essential boundary between the free expression of thought and the protection of reputation.