In the complex and delicate landscape of Italian criminal procedural law, precautionary measures play a crucial role, balancing the need for effective judicial action with the safeguarding of the defendant's fundamental rights. Among these, protective seizure represents a tool of particular importance, often the subject of debate and significant judicial rulings. In this context, the Court of Cassation, with ruling no. 12316 of 2025, has provided a fundamental clarification regarding the issue of prior adversarial proceedings, reaffirming the legitimacy of its absence in the phase of issuing the measure.
Protective seizure, governed by Articles 316 et seq. of the Code of Criminal Procedure (c.p.p.), is a real precautionary measure aimed at guaranteeing the payment of court costs, pecuniary penalties, and civil obligations arising from the crime, such as compensation for damages to the victim. Its "real" nature implies that it directly affects specific assets of the defendant (or civilly liable party), withdrawing them from their availability to ensure the future execution of credits. The peculiar characteristic of this measure is often its adoption "by surprise," i.e., without prior institution of adversarial proceedings with the party affected. This method, while essential to prevent the suspect or defendant from dissipating their assets, has in the past raised questions about its compatibility with constitutional and conventional principles.
The question of the constitutionality of Article 317, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for conflict with Articles 3, 24, and 111 of the Constitution and Article 6 of the ECHR, is manifestly unfounded, as it does not provide for the institution of adversarial proceedings before the issuance of the order for protective seizure, since the eventual and deferred adversarial proceeding, ensured by the request for review under Article 318 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, satisfies the guarantees of defense with respect to a real precautionary measure that is by nature a physiologically surprise act, making the choice of its adoption "inaudita altera parte" not unreasonable.
This maxim of the Court of Cassation, taken from the ruling in question, represents the core of the decision. The Court addresses and resolves the question of the constitutionality of Article 317, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which does not provide for adversarial proceedings before the issuance of protective seizure. The main argument of the ruling is that, although prior adversarial proceedings are lacking, the guarantees of defense are not diminished but are ensured in a subsequent and equally effective phase: that of review. The very nature of protective seizure, conceived to be a "surprise" act in order to protect the effectiveness of the measure, makes the legislative choice to adopt it "inaudita altera parte" (i.e., without hearing the other party) entirely reasonable and not in conflict with constitutional and supranational principles.
The ruling of the Court of Cassation, concerning the case of the defendant M. R., is part of a solid line of case law that has long clarified the delicate balance between the effectiveness of precautionary measures and the right to defense. The Court held that adversarial proceedings, although not prior, are fully guaranteed by the possibility of filing a request for review pursuant to Article 318 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This remedy allows the defendant to appeal the protective seizure order before the Court of Liberty (T.D.L.), as happened in the specific case with the partial rejection by the Court of Liberty of Turin. In this forum, the T.D.L. is called upon to assess the existence of the prerequisites for seizure, its necessity, and proportionality, ensuring full judicial review.
The Court examined the issue in light of several fundamental articles:
The Court of Cassation, in line with previous rulings (such as those cited in the previous maxims, e.g., no. 51576 of 2019 or United Sections no. 15290 of 2018), has therefore confirmed the solidity of this normative and interpretative framework.
For the defendant M. R. and for all those who are subjected to protective seizure, ruling no. 12316/2025 reaffirms a fundamental principle: the absence of prior adversarial proceedings does not mean the absence of protection. On the contrary, the system provides a robust and swift judicial review mechanism through recourse to the Court of Liberty. This means that, once the seizure order has been notified, the defendant and their lawyer must act promptly. The request for review becomes the main arena in which to contest the legitimacy and validity of the measure, presenting evidence and arguments in their defense. Timeliness and precision in drafting the appeal are essential to best protect the financial interests involved.
The ruling of the Court of Cassation no. 12316 of 2025 does not introduce revolutions but strengthens a consolidated principle of our criminal procedural law: the balance between the effectiveness of real precautionary measures and the guarantee of the right to defense. The "surprise" nature of protective seizure is recognized as a functional necessity for its very effectiveness, but this need is tempered and balanced by the provision of subsequent, full, and effective judicial review through the appeal process. This model ensures that, even in the immediacy of the precautionary action, individual rights are fully protected through adversarial proceedings, albeit deferred. For those facing such an incisive measure, the assistance of a lawyer experienced in criminal procedural law is crucial to navigate the complexities of the system and ensure the full defense of their rights and interests.