With decision no. 14013 of January 9, 2025 (filed April 9, 2025), the Court of Cassation, First Criminal Section, addresses a topic of great practical interest: the possibility for the judge of execution to grant a suspended sentence once the 'continuazione' (continuous offense) under art. 81, paragraph 2, of the Italian Criminal Code has been recognized between facts already judged with final rulings. The ruling, which partially annuls without referral the decision of the Juvenile Court of Florence, follows the path laid out by previous consistent judgments but introduces useful operational clarifications.
The Court starts from the premise that the execution phase is not merely a place for the arithmetic summation of final sentences: art. 671 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure grants the judge of execution the power to unify multiple convictions under the discipline of the continuous offense, with a consequent re-determination of the sanction. The problem arises when, by doing so, the new sentence falls within the limits of art. 163 of the Italian Criminal Code (2 years, raised to 3 in certain cases), even if the suspension was denied during the cognitive phase.
The judge of execution who applies the discipline of the continuous offense to multiple facts subject to separate convictions may grant the benefit of the suspended sentence, which was not recognized by the judges in the cognitive phase, unless the latter expressly excluded it as a consequence of a judgment based on a negative prognosis of abstention from committing crimes. (In the reasoning, the Court clarified that if, instead, the benefit was excluded in the cognitive phase solely due to the sentencing, the judge of execution who reduces it within the limits of art. 163 of the Italian Criminal Code can re-evaluate its eligibility).
The maxim, taken from previous rulings (n. 46146/2018 among others), emphasizes a principle of balance: the judge of execution can intervene on the suspension only when its granting was originally denied for quantitative reasons (excessive sentence). If, however, the denial was due to a negative prognosis regarding future abstention from crime, this assessment, which is substantive and subjective in nature, remains binding.
According to the Constitutional Court (judgment no. 64/2022), the balance between the legality of the sentence and the personalization of treatment involves respect for the final judgment, but without compromising the prerogatives of individualization recognized in the execution phase. The judgment in question moves along this ridge, preventing the judge of execution from becoming a fourth level of judgment, but at the same time preventing the convicted person from being deprived of a benefit that would otherwise be due.
The ruling is of particular interest for post-judgment defense strategies:
Cassation no. 14013/2025 aligns with established case law but offers a precise operational criterion: the key is the reason for the original exclusion of the suspended sentence. If the reasoning concerned exclusively the measure of the sentence, the judge of execution, by re-determining that sentence after recognizing the continuous offense, can (and, in many cases, must) re-examine the benefit. If, conversely, the denial stemmed from a serious lack of favorable prognosis, any further intervention is precluded. This interpretation balances the certainty of the final judgment with the rehabilitative purpose, returning to defense counsel a useful but not omnipotent procedural tool.