In the Italian legal landscape, the correct qualification of crimes is crucial, especially when illicit conduct evolves with technology. An emblematic case is the theft of electricity through the tampering of electronic meters. The Court of Cassation, with its recent judgment no. 19021 of 2025, has provided a fundamental clarification, precisely delineating the boundaries between the crime of theft and that of computer fraud in such circumstances. This ruling not only consolidates a jurisprudential trend but also offers valuable insights for understanding the legal implications of such conduct.
The core of the issue examined by the Supreme Court, in the case involving defendant C. L., concerned the legal qualification of altering data in the measurement "chip" of an electronic meter, in order to avoid paying for consumed energy. Jurisprudence has sometimes oscillated between the application of art. 624 of the Criminal Code (theft) and art. 640 ter of the Criminal Code (computer fraud). This is not an academic distinction, as it entails significant differences in terms of penalties and the constituent elements of the crime.
The judgment, delivered by the Fifth Criminal Section with President P. R. and Rapporteur S. E. V. S., confirmed a consolidated trend: in such situations, the crime of aggravated theft is constituted. But what are the reasons? It is essential to analyze the maxim:
The theft of electricity carried out by altering the data contained in the measurement "chip" of an electronic meter constitutes the crime of theft and not computer fraud, as such conduct is not aimed, in itself, at altering the electronic device, but at the unauthorized appropriation of unmetered energy.
This maxim is of extraordinary importance. It clarifies that the determining factor is not so much the alteration of the electronic device itself, but the agent's ultimate goal: the undue appropriation of another's property, namely electricity. The alteration of the "chip" is not the ultimate end, but the "fraudulent means" through which the theft of energy is accomplished. Electricity, in fact, has long been recognized by jurisprudence, including the United Sections (judgment no. 10495 of 1996), as a "movable property" for the purposes of the crime of theft (art. 624 of the Criminal Code).
Why does the Court of Cassation insist on the applicability of theft (art. 624 of the Criminal Code) and not computer fraud (art. 640 ter of the Criminal Code)? The key lies in the purpose of the conduct. Computer fraud is constituted when the agent unlawfully interferes with a computer or telematic system, or with data, to procure an unjust profit to the detriment of others. Here, the alteration manipulates the system's operation to obtain an economic advantage through an operation that the altered system performs defectively.
In the case of electricity theft, however, the alteration of the meter masks the withdrawal of a physical resource, energy, materially stolen from the supplier. The "chip" is tampered with to prevent the correct accounting of consumption, but the act of appropriating the energy occurs independently of the altered functioning of the measurement system. The energy is "taken" and consumed without the supplier's knowledge or consent. This constitutes the objective element of theft: the taking and appropriation of another's movable property.
The aggravating circumstance applied is that provided for by art. 625, paragraph 1, no. 7 of the Criminal Code, which contemplates the use of "fraudulent means." The alteration of the "chip" falls perfectly within this category, as it constitutes an artifice capable of evading the owner's vigilance and enabling undue appropriation.
The jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation has repeatedly reaffirmed this principle, as demonstrated by the references to previous maxims cited in the judgment. This trend emphasizes the interpretative continuity of the Supreme Court:
Judgment no. 19021 of 2025 by the Court of Cassation represents a firm point in criminal law, confirming that the theft of electricity through the tampering of electronic meters must be qualified as aggravated theft and not as computer fraud. This ruling reiterates the centrality of the objective element of the crime of theft, namely the appropriation of another's movable property, and clarifies that the use of technological tools to carry out such theft constitutes an aggravating circumstance rather than a different type of crime.
For citizens, this decision serves as a warning about the seriousness of the legal consequences arising from such conduct. For legal professionals, it consolidates an interpretation that ensures certainty and consistency in the application of criminal laws in a constantly evolving sector, where technology can be both a tool for progress and a means for illicit acts.