The Italian criminal justice system, with its complex architecture, provides tools aimed at balancing the need to protect the community and the victim with the fundamental rights of the suspect or defendant. Among these, personal precautionary measures play a primary role, being intended to prevent the repetition of crimes, the tampering of evidence, or flight. Their application, modification, or revocation is governed by precise rules, the interpretation of which can generate delicate legal issues. The Court of Cassation, with its recent judgment no. 18753 of March 19, 2025 (filed on May 19, 2025), has provided a fundamental clarification regarding the correct appeal instrument for decisions adjusting the precautionary regime, outlining a procedural path that deserves attention and in-depth analysis.
Precautionary measures, governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Articles 272 et seq. c.p.p.), are not punitive in nature, but rather preventive and provisional. They aim to guarantee the purposes of the trial (periculum libertatis, periculum fugae, periculum in mora), protecting public safety and the integrity of the investigation. These measures, ranging from the obligation to report to the judicial police to pre-trial detention, are ordered by the judge at the request of the public prosecutor, in the presence of serious indications of guilt and specific precautionary needs. Their application, however, is not static: the precautionary regime can and must be adapted to changed needs and circumstances, as provided for by Article 276 c.p.p. It is precisely on this flexibility that the Supreme Court's ruling is based.
The core of the issue addressed by judgment no. 18753/2025 concerns the correct appeal route for a decision ordering the adjustment of the precautionary regime. The Italian criminal procedural system provides two main appeal instruments against decisions concerning precautionary measures: review (art. 309 c.p.p.) and appeal (art. 310 c.p.p.). Review is traditionally available against the order that first imposes a coercive precautionary measure, allowing for broad scrutiny of the existence of serious indications of guilt and precautionary needs. Appeal, on the other hand, is provided for orders that, among other things, apply, modify, or revoke precautionary measures other than coercive ones, or for specific decisions of the Review Court. The distinction is crucial, as it affects the deadlines, procedures, and scope of judicial review.
A decision ordering the adjustment of the precautionary regime to the situation presented in concrete is not appealable by a request for review under Article 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but rather by the appeal provided for by Article 310 of the same code. (Case in which the measure of obligation to report to the judicial police was imposed in addition to the measure of removal from the family home with prescriptions, due to the unavailability of the victim, who intended to resume relations with the suspect, to be equipped with an electronic monitoring device).
The Supreme Court, with the ruling of President A. E. and Rapporteur V. O., rejecting the appeal of the defendant I. against the Liberty Court of Rome, clearly reiterated that a decision to adjust an existing precautionary measure falls under Article 310 c.p.p., and not Article 309 c.p.p. This means that when the judge decides to modify an existing measure, for example by adding new prescriptions or replacing it with a different one, the defense cannot resort to review but must file an appeal. The reasoning behind this orientation lies in the nature of the act: it is not a new imposition of the measure, but rather its modulation in response to new circumstances or a re-evaluation of precautionary needs. The case examined by the Court is particularly illuminating: the defendant, already subject to removal from the family home with prescriptions, had the obligation to report to the judicial police added. This addition was motivated by the particular situation of the victim, who, despite intending to resume relations with the suspect, had shown unavailability to be equipped with an electronic monitoring device. A case that highlights the complexity of family dynamics and the need for the judicial system to find pragmatic solutions, albeit with the correct application of procedural rules.
This judgment, in line with previous trends (see, for example, Cass. pen. no. 4939 of 2025 Rv. 287587-01 and the United Sections no. 44060 of 2024 Rv. 287319-02), reinforces the principle that the choice of appeal instrument is strictly linked to the nature of the decision being appealed. For legal professionals, this entails the need for careful evaluation of the content of the judicial order:
The ruling also highlights the growing attention of the legislator and jurisprudence towards the protection of victims, especially in contexts of domestic or relational violence. The victim's willingness or unwillingness to cooperate with protection tools, such as electronic devices, can influence the adjustment of precautionary measures imposed on the suspect, seeking to ensure a balance between personal liberty and safety.
Judgment no. 18753/2025 of the Court of Cassation represents an important landmark in the landscape of appeals concerning precautionary measures. By providing a clear indication of the appeal instrument available against decisions adjusting the precautionary regime, the Supreme Court contributes to ensuring legal certainty and preventing procedural errors that could compromise the effectiveness of the defense or delay the administration of justice. For lawyers and sector professionals, in-depth knowledge of these distinctions is essential to best protect the interests of their clients, whether they are the suspect or the victim. A correct procedure is, ultimately, a guarantee of a fair and just trial for all.