The Qualification of a Public Service Officer: Ruling 20127/2025 and the Role of CUP Employees

In Italian criminal law, the distinction between a public official and a public service officer is crucial for the configuration of crimes against the Public Administration. Ruling no. 20127 of 2025 by the Court of Cassation offers significant clarification on this qualification, focusing on the role of employees of healthcare companies assigned to Unified Booking Centres (CUP). A case that invites reflection on the boundaries between purely executive activities and those involving decision-making powers, essential for attributing a specific legal qualification.

The Regulatory Context and the Case of the CUP Employee

To understand the ruling, we refer to Articles 357 and 358 of the Criminal Code. The former defines a public official as one who exercises functions with authoritative or certifying powers. The latter outlines a public service officer as someone who provides a public service without such powers, not limited to a mere order-taking role. The crucial difference lies in autonomy and discretion. The Court of Cassation, with its ruling of April 30, 2025, examined the case of C. P., a CUP employee of a healthcare company, charged with a crime that presupposed this qualification. His task was to attest to the payment of the 'ticket'. The Court of Appeal had convicted him, but the Court of Cassation annulled the conviction with referral, raising doubts about the correct application of the regulatory definitions.The employee of a public healthcare company assigned to the CUP desk with the task of attesting to the payment of the "ticket" by users does not hold the subjective qualification of a public service officer, regardless of the fact that they are required to document the handling of public money for internal verification purposes related to the regular execution of the employment relationship. (Case in which the Court annulled the conviction, remanding to the referring judge to verify whether the appellant performed the tasks assigned to him with autonomy and discretion, requirements that alone are capable of characterizing the activity as not merely executive).

The Court of Cassation states that the mere attestation of ticket payment, even if it involves handling public money, is not sufficient to confer the qualification of a public service officer. The decisive point is the absence of autonomy and discretion. The activity of a CUP operator who merely records a payment and issues a receipt, without powers of evaluation or decision with external legal effects, is considered a purely executive task. The referral serves to verify the actual presence of these qualifying elements in the specific case.

Autonomy and Discretion: Distinguishing Criteria and Conclusions

The ruling reiterates a consolidated principle: the distinction between a public service officer and a mere executor is based on autonomy and discretion. Contact with public money is not enough to acquire such a significant criminal qualification. It is necessary for the individual to:

• Perform an activity that expresses the will of the Public Administration.
• Have a margin of choice or evaluation in their functions.
• Not limit themselves to performing material acts or technical operations devoid of decisional relevance.

The Court of Cassation has always emphasized the need for a 'quid pluris' beyond mere execution. Ruling no. 20127 of 2025 serves as a warning for the correct interpretation of subjective qualifications in criminal law, offering greater clarity and protecting public employees from an expansive application of criminal norms. Each case must be carefully evaluated, taking into account the specific nature of the duties and the degree of decision-making power exercised.